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The Department of Defense continues to aggressively pursue A-76 competitive 
sourcing targets set by the Office of Management and Budget.  As more A-76 acquisitions 
are processed, it is imperative that these studies are conducted fairly and efficiently.  Legal 
challenges to A-76 actions disrupt the process and have a negative impact on the 
organizations and people undergoing study.  Historically, industry has successfully 
protested a high percentage of A-76 procurements.  This thesis examines General 
Accounting Office A-76 bid protest decisions issued between 5 February 1996 and 23 
December 2002.  The cases and protest issues are analyzed to determine the reasons that 
A-76 protests were lodged, and the reasons that A-76 protests were lost by the 
Government.  The thesis identifies common themes, trends, and key issues, and draws 
conclusions based on that information.  Recommendations for A-76 process improvements 
are developed and provided.  It is the researcher’s hope that this thesis will be of benefit to 
A-76 personnel, particularly to Government acquisition personnel responsible for 
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A.   AREA OF RESEARCH  
This thesis examines General Accounting Office (GAO) protest decisions on 
Government A-76 Competitive Sourcing Studies.  These GAO cases will be examined 
for trends, key issues, and common themes.  This analysis may enable the development 
of both preventive acquisition strategies to avoid future problems, as well as improved 
techniques and suggestions related to contracting, source selection, and the Government 
versus contractor cost comparison decision.  
B.   METHODOLOGY 
The primary source documents are the GAO decisions themselves, gathered from 
GAO’s web site, which posts all bid protest decisions rendered by the agency.  Several 
other Navy and Department of Defense (DoD) data sources will be used to cross-
reference the identification of the cases, to insure that all A-76 protests are captured and 
examined.  This examination will be limited to GAO A-76 decisions issued between 
February 5, 1996 and December 23, 2002.     
The researcher will provide background information, including a discussion of the 
basics of the A-76 process and the A-76 protest process.   The Office of Management and 
Budget’s (OMB’s) new proposed A-76 process will also be discussed.  The results of a 
literature search will be presented, addressing industry and Government concerns and 
issues related to the conduct of A-76 studies.    
The researcher will group the GAO case data by use of a number of different 
parameters, including the identity of the buying agency/agency under study, the type of 
study, and other factors.  After arraying the data in this fashion, the Government buying 
agency’s protest “win rate” will then be applied across the same groupings.  The main 
idea is to examine whether (e.g.) the Government’s win rate is related to who conducted 
the study (Army vs. USAF vs. Navy), study type, etc.    
The data will be further examined by grouping the issues challenged in the 
protests by general topic or area.  The topical groupings will be derived via an initial 
examination of the protests.  The issues in each topical area will then be analyzed.   
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As a result of this analysis, the researcher will provide short- and long- term 
recommendations, and will suggest areas of further research.   
 
C.   KEY PROBLEM 
A-76 studies engender a significant number of protests. For example, between 
1995 and 2000, DoD conducted 286 studies.  [Ref. 54 p. 4]  During that same period, this 
thesis identifies 21 protests lodged.  Thus, more than seven percent of those A-76 
acquisitions were protested.  Any protest, whether successful or not, creates disruption in 
the acquisition process, causes a loss of time and money spent litigating the issues, and 
often damages Government-contractor relationships, at least for a time.  Further, if a 
protest is lost, further time, effort, and funds are utilized to correct the problem, re-do 
portions of the acquisition, or take other remedial action.  In many cases, the Government 
is delayed in providing the supply or service to the end-user.   
 
D.   POLICY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The problems associated with any protest are magnified in A-76 acquisitions.  In 
addition to the normal stakeholders in a procurement, that is, the offerors, contracting 
office, end-user, and many other support entities (e.g. Government counsel, Defense 
Contract Audit Agency, etc.), in an A-76 study Government employees’ jobs are on the 
line.  The employee stress involved in being announced for study, observing the conduct 
of the study (such as data collection involving his or her own duties), and working 
through this period at a normally productive level, is significant.  These stresses are 
greatly magnified if a study is delayed, a favorable decision (to the employees) is 
overturned, or if the contracting officer is forced to re-do various steps in the acquisition 
process.  Any steps taken to improve or streamline the study process, including avoidance 
or successful defense of protests, will pay dividends in decreased Government time, 





E.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary and subsidiary research questions that will be investigated are as 
follows:   
Primary Research Question: What common issues and trends are contained in 
GAO A-76 bid protests, and what acquisition planning and process actions may be taken 
to alleviate future problems? 
Subsidiary Research Questions: 
1. How numerous are the GAO protests lodged against A-76 studies? 
2. What are the underlying causes of these protests, and what factors affect the 
success or failure of the protests? 
3. What are the common issues, themes, or trends associated with these protests?   
4. What acquisition planning and process actions may be taken to alleviate future 
problems, particularly in light of the new OMB procedures? 
 
F.   ASSUMPTIONS 
The main assumption at the beginning of the research is that certain patterns of 
issues, common themes, or problems with A-76 acquisitions will emerge.  The 
researcher’s hope is that the many different protest issues can be rationally grouped, and 
can therefore be examined empirically, rather than just in an anecdotal fashion.  Grouping 
in some manner would then allow an examination of the underlying causes for A-76 
protests, and the reasons that these protests are often lost.  Most importantly, if common 
underlying problems could be identified, it might be possible to suggest preventive or 
corrective actions to avoid some future protests, or increase the chances of a successful 
Government defense against challenges, should they occur.     
Another assumption at the outset is that some of the A-76 protests will cover more 
than one issue within a single protest action/decision.  Thus, there may be more issues 
than protests. The researcher ultimately will examine the protests on an issue-by-issue 
basis.   
A third assumption is that the reader will be generally familiar with the basics of 
the defense acquisition process.    
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G.   LIMITATIONS 
 This thesis examines General Accounting Office (GAO) bid protest decisions on 
acquisitions conducted under, or related to, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Circular A-76.  Circular A-76 and its implementing policies and procedures provide for 
conducting competitions to determine whether it is more economical to perform certain 
services in-house with Government personnel, or by use of a contractor to provide those 
services. 
Legal challenges lodged against A-76 competitions are not in fact limited to GAO 
bid protest procedures.  Other venues for protest or objection include protests directly to 
the buying/contracting activity or agency, action in the U.S. Court of Claims or the 
various Federal District Courts, or formal A-76 appeals to the administrative appeal 
authority identified for each study.  However, the most useful analysis is to examine the 
GAO cases.  Very few actions are lodged in the U.S. Court of Claims or the various 
Federal District Courts.  [Ref. 51 p. 69]  Many challenges initially lodged with the 
administrative appeal authority end up being heard at GAO.  Meaningful information and 
analysis is thus possible from an examination of the GAO decisions alone.  Further detail 
on the specific role of GAO within this framework is provided below.  
Another limitation is the quality of the narrative and the amount of detail provided 
in the GAO decisions themselves.  Information regarding offerers’ technical and price 
proposals, the Government’s source selection strategies and pricing structure, and a 
number of other important details must be gathered from the GAO written decisions.  
Missing information or lack of detail could limit the value of the analysis, and/or render 
the analysis more difficult.   
 
H.   DEFINITIONS 
A-76 – The government’s policy that defines procedures for determining whether 
a service is performed more economically in-house by Government employees, or by use 
of a contractor.    
Competitive sourcing – Term used within Government to describe the A-76 
competitive process.   
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Contracting Officer – Government official with primary responsibility for 
conducting the acquisition portions of an A-76 study.  Includes market research and 
advertising, solicitation, closing, evaluation of private sector offers, source selection, and 
assistance in evaluation of Government proposal. 
Cost comparison – The overall acquisition/study process by which the best 
contractor proposal is selected, and then compared against the Government proposal, to 
determine which is more economical.  More narrowly, that step in the process in which 
the selected potential contractor’s cost is compared to the Government’s cost. 
Direct conversion – Award of a contract using “traditional” methods, i.e. the 
Government does not prepare a formal proposal.  Generally is used after an initial 
estimate determines that contracting would be more economical.  There are specific 
limitations on use of this procedure in OMB and DoD policies. 
Full study – A formal A-76 process in which competitive contractor proposals are 
received and analyzed, a potential contractor is selected, and then the contractor’s and 
Government’s costs are compared.  This contrasts with a “direct conversion” defined 
above.   
In-House Cost Estimate (IHCE) – The cost/price portion of the Government’s 
response, which provides a price to perform the services, backed by supporting cost 
documentation. 
Management Plan (MP) – Name for the technical portions of the government 
proposal/response to the A-76 solicitation.  (Sometimes refers to both technical and cost 
portions.)   
Most Efficient Organization (MEO) – Portion of the Government’s technical 
response that addresses number, mix, and utilization of staffing required to perform the 
performance work statement (PWS.) 
Outsourcing – Sometimes means the act of acquiring work via contract rather than 
performing the work in-house.  This term was previously used within Government to 
describe the A-76 competitive process, but now “Competitive sourcing” is used to 
describe the A-76 competitive process.   
Performance Work Statement (PWS) – The description of required services, 
including tasks and performance standards, that the Government or contractor must meet. 
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Source selection – The process of selecting the prospective contractor from 
among private sector offerors. 
Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) – The group, sometimes used on 
more complex procurements, that reviews both technical and price/cost proposals from 
private sector offerors, and makes recommendations to the Source Selection Authority 
(SSA).   
Source Selection Authority (SSA) – Government official who determines winner 
of the private sector portion of the competition.  Often, but not always, the Contracting 
Officer. 
Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) – The group that analyzes private 
sector offerors’ technical proposals, and makes recommendations to the Contracting 
Officer or Source Selection Authority (SSA).   
Strategic sourcing – Term that encompasses the A-76 process and other 
techniques such as business process reengineering (BPR).   
Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) – Group that tests and evaluates the 
technical suitability of material, equipment, or system offered to the Government.   
Technical Performance Plan (TPP) – Portion of the Government’s technical 
response that addresses the methods by which the Government intends to perform the 
PWS requirements.   
Transition Plan (TP) - Portion of the Government’s technical response that 
addresses the steps and timeline needed to move from current performance to full 
implementation of the MEO. 
 
I.   CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized as follows:   
Chapter I – Introduction – This chapter identifies the topic, provides an overview 
of the research to be conducted, describes the importance of the topic, and outlines the 
goals of the thesis as stated in the principal and subsidiary research questions.  It also 
provides definitions, as well as limitations and assumptions.   
Chapter II – Theoretical Background and Literature Search – This chapter will 
provide background information, including a discussion of the basics of the A-76 process 
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and the A-76 protest process.  It will also contain a discussion of OMB’s new proposed 
A-76 process.  The results of a literature search will be presented, addressing industry and 
Government concerns and issues related to the conduct of A-76 studies.    
Chapter III – Presentation of Data – This chapter will present and array the GAO 
case data.   
Chapter IV – Data Analysis – This chapter will analyze the bid protest data as 
discussed above.     
Chapter V – Conclusions and Recommendations – This chapter will include 
short- and long- term recommendations, answers to the research questions, and 
suggestions for areas of further research.   
 
J.   BENEFITS OF THE THESIS 
As discussed below, A-76 targets are still being aggressively pursued.  Any 
recommendations that reduce the likelihood of protests, or increase the likelihood of 
successfully defending against protests, benefit all the stakeholders. These 
recommendations may be of particular value to Government acquisition personnel and 
others in charge of processing A-76 competitions.  The thesis has the potential to benefit 
the researcher’s local command, the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Norfolk, 
as well as the broader Navy, DoD, and Government acquisition community.   
 
K.   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter identified the topic, provided an overview of the research to be 
conducted, described the importance of the topic, and outlined the goals of the thesis as 
stated in the principal and subsidiary research questions.  It also provided definitions, as 
well as limitations and assumptions.   
The next chapter will provide background information, including a discussion of 
the basics of the A-76 process and the A-76 protest process.  It will also contain a 
discussion of OMB’s new proposed A-76 process.  The results of a literature search will 
 8
be presented, addressing industry and Government concerns and issues related to the 
























II.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SEARCH 
   
A.   BACKGROUND  
Throughout the twentieth century, federal Government policy has been to use 
private contractor sources for services readily available in the marketplace. The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 was issued in 1966, and prescribed 
federal policies for studying commercial activities and conversion of in-house work to 
contract.  In 1979, OMB issued the Revised Supplemental Handbook (RSH), which set 
forth specific procedures for conducting cost comparisons between the public and private 
sector.  [Ref. 53 p. 2]  The RSH provides for a cost comparison to determine if services 
that are commercial in nature may be performed more economically by Government 
employees or by a contractor.  Some functions are considered “inherently governmental” 
and are therefore exempt from A-76 competition.  These functions require the exercise of 
discretion or involve decision-making on behalf of the Government, and therefore must 
be performed by Government employees.  [Ref. 64 p. 55]  There are also exemptions 
from A-76 policies for functions directly related to national defense or for functions 
involving direct patient healthcare.  [Ref. 64 p. 3]            
The Department of Defense (DoD) was active in conducting A-76 studies during 
the early to mid 1980s.  After a hiatus, in 1995 DoD again began to plan and conduct 
numerous A-76 studies, as a means of saving infrastructure costs.  DoD ultimately plans 
to study nearly 250,000 positions, and achieve over $11 billion in savings by 2005.  [Ref. 
53 p. 2]  Many civilian agencies are now beginning to conduct A-76 competitions.  OMB 
has tasked the agencies to perform A-76 studies on at least 15% of all commercial in 
nature positions by the end of fiscal 2003.  [Ref. 69]   
DoD hopes to utilize A-76 studies to save significant dollars in reduced 
infrastructure costs. For example, based on DoD’s prior experience with A-76 in the 
1980s, the Navy estimated that it could reduce the costs of services an average of 30% 
over the pre-study costs, whether a contractor or the Government Most Efficient 
Organization (MEO) was successful.  [Ref. 62 p. 17]  The program is one way to “right-
size” the supporting workforce in an era of tighter dollars, to help pay for critical military 
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quality of life improvements (pay, benefits, health care, housing, etc.), and to free up 
scarce dollars for direct production and modernization of weapons systems and platforms.   
A-76 studies are also seen as a way to streamline and improve the organic 
workforce, rather than to simply “contract out” jobs.  Exposing the federal workforce to 
market competition is designed to force the Government to streamline its processes, 
reorganize its workforce along newer, more efficient lines, and thereby save money 
without sacrificing the quality of support services.  The DoD is still actively planning for 
hundreds of A-76 studies, covering hundreds of thousands of jobs.  President Bush has 
endorsed the continuation of A-76 studies as a valuable strategy in his administration.  
The president has set a goal for federal agencies to complete A-76 studies on 
approximately 425,000 Government positions by the end of fiscal 2004.  [Ref. 69]     
 
B.   THE A-76 PROCESS  
The initial  “contracting” portion of the A-76 process is somewhat similar to a 
normal acquisition, with private firms responding to the Government’s solicitation 
requirements.  However, in an A-76 competition, the Government Management Plan 
team prepares a response as well.  In these A-76 acquisitions, a “winning” private sector 
offerer is first selected.  The private firm is usually selected via competitive procedures, 
although occasionally preference programs such as the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act (for 
single-source direct purchase from a non-profit workshop that employs the disabled) are 
used.   
There are three primary competitive evaluation methods for private contractor 
source selection that are utilized in A-76 acquisitions.  The first is the use of Invitation 
For Bids (IFB), under the procedures of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 
14.  The IFB method is characterized by public opening of priced bids.  Contractor 
selection is made on the basis of the low price received from a “responsible” firm (i.e. a 
firm that is judged to have sufficient capability, capacity, and finances to perform the 
contract) that has submitted a bid responsive to the solicitation requirements.   The 
second and third methods both utilize competitive negotiation techniques under the 
procedures of FAR Part 15.  The second competitive method is a negotiated procurement 
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with selection of a firm based on the low priced technically acceptable offer.  This 
technique allows consideration of selection criteria other than price (e.g. the relevance 
and quality of a company’s past performance on similar contracts), and permits 
discussions and proposal revisions to correct deficiencies, clarify ambiguities, and 
improve pricing.  To be eligible for selection, a proposal must be determined acceptable 
in the non-price technical factors included in the solicitation.  The third competitive 
method is use of a negotiated procurement with best value selection based on the firm 
offering the most favorable combination of price and technical merit.    The Contracting 
Officer determines the relative weight of the technical and price proposals, and the 
relative weight of factors within the technical proposal, and discloses these weights in the 
solicitation.  For example, the technical proposal can be considered “more important” 
than price (or “approximately equal”, “significantly less important”, etc.)  Within the 
technical proposal, various technical factors (e.g. past performance, corporate experience, 
and personnel staffing plan) can be considered of “equal weight,” or the factors could be 
listed in “descending order of importance,” etc. These best value trade-off techniques 
allow selection of other than the lowest price, using subjective judgment to evaluate 
various aspects of a firm’s technical background and expertise.  This third competitive 
source selection method also permits discussions and proposal revisions to correct 
deficiencies, clarify ambiguities, and improve pricing.  With this maximum flexibility 
comes an increased risk of challenges from disgruntled losing offerors.   
Once the private sector “challenger” is selected, the contracting officer/Source 
Selection Authority (SSA) turns to an examination of the Government’s proposal, known 
as the Management Plan (MP.)  The technical portion of the management plan consists of 
three parts.  The Technical Performance Plan (TPP) addresses the methods by which the 
Government intends to perform the performance work statement (PWS) requirements.  
The Most Efficient Organization (MEO) addresses the number, mix, and utilization of 
staffing required to perform the PWS.  The Transition Plan (TP) addresses the steps and 
timeline needed to move from current performance to full implementation of the MEO.  
The SSA reviews these documents to insure that the Government’s proposal meets the 
PWS requirements, and to insure that the Government’s proposal provides “the same 
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level of performance and performance quality” as the private sector challenger.  [Ref. 64 
p. 12]   
Many A-76 procurements use the best value trade-off techniques described above 
to select the private sector challenger, allowing the SSA to select other than the lowest-
priced private firm.  However, the A-76 procedures then require a low-price decision to 
select between the contractor and the Government proposals.  [Ref. 64]  Because the 
potential exists under best value for the contractor challenger to offer excesses or 
enhancements above PWS requirements (enhancements which may have increased the 
firm’s costs), the contractor and Government technical proposals must be examined to 
insure that they offer the same levels of performance and performance quality.  [Ref. 64]  
If the contractor has higher performance or quality, the SSA must require that the 
Government Management Plan increase performance to the same levels, and increase its 
price if necessary as well.  In theory at least, this insures a fair price-only cost 
comparison.  The actions of examining the Government and contractor technical 
proposals, and possible increases on the Government side, are known as “balancing” or 
“technical leveling”.   
After any necessary leveling adjustment, the private sector challenger’s price or 
cost is then compared to the Government’s price/cost proposal or “In House Cost 
Estimate” (IHCE.)  A number of cost adjustment factors are first applied.  Typical cost 
adjustment factors include: a decrease to the private sector price to account for additional 
corporate income taxes that will accrue to the Government in the event of a contractor 
victory; an increase to the private sector price for the Government’s cost of contract 
administration; and, an increase to the private sector price for “one-time conversion” 
costs (e.g. severance pay and relocation assistance to displaced federal workers.)  In 
addition, in order to displace an existing Government workforce, the adjusted private 
sector price must also overcome a “minimum conversion differential” of ten million 
dollars, or ten percent of the Government’s total personnel costs, whichever is less.  [Ref. 
64 p. 28]  This differential accounts for the non-quantifiable costs and disruption 
associated with a changeover from a Government workforce to a contracted operation.  
After application of the cost adjustment factors, the low evaluated price (Government or 
contractor) wins the competition.   
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C.   THE A-76 PROTEST PROCESS 
The GAO protest process under A-76 studies is similar to protests against other 
non-A-76 procurements.  Interested losing parties (usually defined by GAO as those 
firms with a potential to win a contract or A-76 cost comparison) may file objections to 
GAO within prescribed time limits.  GAO may dismiss the case (e.g. due to untimely 
filing), or it may elect to hear the case.  The protestor and the procuring agency each tell 
their side of the story, via submission of written documentation, and often via sworn 
testimony from the various participants.  GAO will then rule on the merits of the case.  It 
may deny the protest, thereby supporting the procuring agency’s actions and decision.  
Conversely, it may sustain the protest and support the allegations of the protestor.  GAO 
will then require the procuring agency to take corrective action, often in the form of a re-
competition or re-evaluation of proposals.  Successful protestors may be able to recover 
from the Government the legal and administrative costs of filing the protest. 
There are some differences unique to A-76 procurements.  The A-76 Revised 
Supplemental Handbook and various implementing agency instructions provide for an 
“Administrative Appeal Authority” for each A-76 study.  [Ref. 64 p. 13]  This 
person/entity is usually created within the overall claimancy for the activity undergoing 
study, at an organizational level well above that of the activity being studied.  The appeal 
authority is responsible for reviewing challenges to the cost comparison portion of the 
study, i.e. all aspects leading up to the analysis and outcome of the Government vs. 
contractor-challenger decision. There are several important ramifications regarding the 
role of the administrative appeal authority, and its impact on A-76 General Accounting 
Office (GAO) bid protests.  First, GAO has concluded that the Government proposal 
team does not have standing to protest to GAO. GAO has stated that the Government’s 
proposal is not an offer, no contract will result from a Government A-76 victory, and 
therefore, the Government proposal team is not an interested party to the acquisition.  
[Ref. 7]  Thus, when the Government initially loses an A-76 competition, it must object 
to the appeal authority; it cannot protest to GAO.  
There are also ramifications for potential contractor/private offeror protests.  
GAO’s initial focus is on the private sector source selection aspects of the A-76 
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competition.  If the protest takes issue with the private sector source selection, GAO will 
hear the case immediately.  On the other hand, if an offeror has an objection to the cost 
comparison decision of Government vs. contractor-challenger, GAO will normally hear 
the protest only after an (unsuccessful) appeal to the administrative appeal authority.  
GAO does then consider these protests, generally only from the selected private sector 
offeror, because potentially that offeror failed to receive a contract due to alleged errors 
in conducting the study.  
 
D.   A-76 ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
There are a number of issues and concerns related to the planning and execution 
of A-76 studies conducted by the Department of Defense.  Congress, industry, employee 
groups, and DoD all have a stake in the outcomes and results achieved under A-76.   
GAO issued a “Lessons Learned” report in July 1999 that addressed a number of 
key issues and concerns.  [Ref. 53]  GAO found that use of standardized performance 
work statements, long considered a solid idea, could actually create problems unless the 
PWS was carefully crafted to include all site-specific requirements, conditions, workload, 
and performance parameters.  The report also stated that DoD did not do a very good job 
of disseminating best practices gathered from prior A-76 studies.  GAO also found that 
bundling of various functions into larger studies could achieve savings, but such bundling 
created barriers to small business participation.  [Ref. 53 p. 9]  GAO also recommended 
that DoD use financial tools such as activity based costing (ABC) to better estimate its 
cost of doing business and the savings realized through A-76.  Finally, GAO recognized 
that DoD needed to take action to decrease the time needed to conduct A-76 studies.  
[Ref. 53 p. 12]  In 2002, GAO issued another report on the continuing problems with A-
76.  [Ref. 55]  The extended lead times to complete studies again were noted.  GAO also 
found that the cost to conduct a study was often underestimated, DoD could not 
accurately calculate savings achieved, and the task of identifying and grouping functions 
into individual studies remained challenging.   
DoD has been reluctant to embrace aggressive A-76 targets that are set by the 
Office of Management and Budget.  In 2002, DoD stated it did not plan to meet the OMB 
targets, but instead would use A-76 as only one of a number of strategic sourcing tools to 
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increase efficiency.  [Ref. 71]  Nor has industry always embraced the A-76 process.  
Private firms sometimes feel that the Government uses techniques such as A-76 as a 
market research tool, with no intent to carry through the competition to completion.  [Ref. 
60]  Companies have also objected to the perception of bias created by participation of 
Government employees in the A-76 study process who have a stake in the outcome, e.g. 
managers who oversee the department/s undergoing a study.  [Ref. 60]   
The Navy has also commented on concerns with the A-76 process.  Mr. John 
Graveen, Director, Navy Strategic Sourcing, has recently written that for the relatively 
smaller A-76 studies, the cost associated with the defense of a protest often outweighs the 
savings realized through A-76.  [Ref. 58]  Graveen also noted the problems and protests 
related to perceived conflicts of interest in the A-76 study process, leading to a 
prohibition against Government and support contractor employees participating on both 
the MEO and PWS teams.  [Ref. 58]        
 
E.   THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL 
The problems and concerns with the A-76 process led Congress in 2001 to direct 
the formulation of the “Commercial Activities Panel,” led personally by the Comptroller 
General of the United States (the head of GAO), Mr. David M. Walker.  [Ref. 2]  This 
group was tasked to conduct a review of OMB’s A-76 process, and make 
recommendations for changes and improvements to the process.  Walker pulled together 
a team of top people from Government, academia, labor, and industry, including: E. C. 
“Pete” Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; 
Mark C. Filteau, President, Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.; Kay Coles James, 
Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management; Bobby L. Harnage, Sr., National 
President, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO; David Pryor, 
Director, Institute of Politics, Harvard University; and, Angela B. Styles, Administrator, 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy.   
After several public hearings and a number of meetings, the panel issued its report 
on 30 April 2002.  [Ref. 4]  The panel found that the current A-76 process did achieve 
dollar savings.  However, the group noted, “…A-76 has not worked well…to identify the 
best provider in terms of quality…”  [Ref. 4 p. 10]  The panel concluded that the existing 
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A-76 process focused primarily on low cost, at the expense of quality.   In its report, the 
group unanimously approved and issued ten “Sourcing Principles” as guidance for the 
future conduct of A-76 studies.  The principles included recognition of certain functions 
as inherently governmental, stated that competitions should be conducted fairly and 
efficiently, and recommended that A-76 competitions consider quality and cost factors.  
The ten principles were short on detail and implementation instructions.  For example, 
the panel report did not provide new insights on how to determine if a position should be 
categorized as inherently governmental (and thus exempt from exposure to A-76 
competition.)  [Ref. 2]  Rather, the report cited 1992 Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy (OFPP) language on the subject, ignoring the fact that this and other prior policies 
had led to continuous difficulties in making inherently governmental determinations.  
[Ref. 63]      
When the panel attempted to develop more specific recommendations, the 
diversity of the membership, representing a wide variety of interests and constituencies, 
guaranteed that consensus would be difficult.  [Ref. 2]  Ultimately, the panel added 
additional recommendations based on a “supermajority” (two-thirds) vote among panel 
members.  [Ref. 4 p. 49]  The supermajority recommendations provided that: the 
Government would directly compete against all private sector offerors in a technical and 
price best value trade-off competition based on Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
procedures; the Government proposal would be guaranteed a position in the 
competition’s competitive range (i.e. the Government could not be eliminated without 
first having an opportunity to revise and improve its offer); and, federal employees would 
have bid protest rights similar to private sector firms.  Some panel members opposed the 
possibility of the Government competing on a best value trade-off basis with all private 
firms.  Bobby L. Harnage, Sr. (National President, American Federation of Government 
Employees, AFL-CIO), Colleen M. Kelly (National President, National Treasury 
Employees Union), David Pryor (Director, Institute of Politics, Harvard University), and 
Robert M. Tobias (Distinguished Adjunct Professor, American University) all wrote 
dissenting opinions that were included in the report.  [Ref. 4 Section VI]   
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The Commercial Activities Panel Report recommended implementation of all its 
proposed changes, and tasked OMB with the development of a new A-76 competition 
process.   
 
F.   THE NEW OMB A-76 PROCESS 
On 14 November 2002, OMB issued its draft revision of OMB Circular A-76 for 
public comment.  [Ref. 65]  The revised circular contains a number of changes, many of 
them recommended by the Commercial Activities Panel report.  Significant changes 
include: compressing the allotted time to complete A-76 studies to twelve months (versus 
the current two-year limit for single function studies and four-year limit for multiple 
function studies); providing for the direct best value trade-off comparison between the 
Government proposal and all private offers described above; making the Contracting 
Officer directly responsible for the PWS team; and, making the Source Selection 
Authority (SSA) directly responsible for review of all aspects of the Government’s 
technical and cost/price proposals.   
Reaction has been mixed.  GAO has generally supported the draft revision, but 
disagrees with the proposed aggressive timeline, and noted the lack of a requirement that 
an agency carefully align its competitive sourcing policies with the agency mission (a 
requirement suggested by the Commercial Activities Panel.)  [Ref. 56]  The twelve- 
month timeline is particularly problematic, given that OMB has not suggested where the 
agencies will find the additional resources needed to expedite the process.  Some in 
Congress have also objected to the potential subjectivity of the best value trade-off cost 
comparison analysis.  [Ref. 68]  Government employee labor groups, including the 
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), also object to the new cost 
comparison analysis process.  [Ref. 67]  Government officials in the Executive Branch 
have reacted favorably to the process revisions in most cases.  [Ref. 61]     
DoD has provided formal comments to the draft OMB A-76 revision.  [Ref. 66]  
DoD has recommended that: the new procedures should only apply to A-76 studies 
announced after the publication date of the new A-76 circular; the timeline be set at 
eighteen months instead of one year; and, the administrative appeal process be replaced 
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by allowing an unsuccessful Government Management Plan team to file a bid protest 
directly with the procuring agency Contracting Officer.   
OMB is reviewing these inputs as well as hundreds of other comments, criticisms, 
and suggestions for changes to the draft A-76 circular.  [Ref. 1]    Ms. Angela B. Styles, 
Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, has stated that the final version of 
the new A-76 policy will likely be issued in May 2003.  [Ref. 70]   
The new A-76 circular is not yet in effect.  Therefore, no A-76 acquisitions have 
been conducted under the new procedures.  Accordingly, this thesis will collect and 
analyze protest data generated under the current A-76 process, and will not analyze the 
effectiveness of the proposed new process.    
   
G.   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided background information, including a discussion of the 
basics of the A-76 process and the A-76 protest process.  It also discussed OMB’s new 
proposed A-76 process.  The results of a literature search were presented, addressing 
industry and Government concerns and issues related to the conduct of A-76 studies.    










III.  PRESENTATION OF DATA 
A.  OVERVIEW 
The researcher has located 46 General Accounting Office (GAO) bid protest 
decisions either directly or indirectly related to Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Circular A-76 studies.  All but one involve Department of Defense (DoD) 
acquisitions, as the civilian agencies have not yet conducted a significant number of A-76 
studies in the present phase (since 1995.)  (The lone exception is Southwest Anesthesia 
Services, in which Southwest alleged that the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Indian Health Service (IHS) should have conducted an A-76 competition prior to 
canceling a solicitation and securing services in-house.  [Ref. 47])  The researcher has 
grouped the data by use of a number of different parameters: (1) all GAO A-76 decisions; 
(2) procuring agency/agency under study; (3) study type (full study, direct conversion, 
etc.); (4) private sector source selection strategy; (5) year of protest action; and, (6) 
protest type (award protest or pre-award protest.) 
After arraying the data in this fashion, the Government buying agency’s “win 
rate” (see below) is then applied across the same groupings.  In the next chapter, the case 
data will be analyzed to determine whether (e.g.) the Government’s protest win rate is 
related to who conducted the study (Army vs. USAF vs. Navy), study type, etc.  The 
number of cases is small, so the resultant rates may not be scientifically valid from a pure 
statistics’ viewpoint.  However, an examination of the win rates by the various 
parameters may be useful to uncover significant trends.   
The data will then be further arrayed by the types of issues protested, with the win 
rate applied to each issue category.  The issue data will also be analyzed in the next 
chapter, to determine if the types of issues that were contested in the GAO cases affect 
the win rates.  The total number of issues in some of the categories is relatively small.  
However, by examining the win rates by issue category, the researcher expects to gain 




B.  IMPORTANT NOTE ABOUT “GOVERNMENT WIN RATE” 
The terms “Government win rate”, “win rate”, “Government win”, or “win” are 
defined to mean that the Government procuring agency successfully won or defended the 
protest.  These terms do NOT refer to which entity won the A-76 cost comparison, 
Government or contractor.  Even though private sector offerors are the protestors here, a 
number of the initial cost comparison decisions were originally made in favor of a 
contractor. 
Government protest wins can result from a complete victory (e.g. protest 
“denied”), or dismissal (e.g. protest filed late).  Contractor/offeror wins (i.e. Government 
losses) can result from a clear victory (e.g. protest “sustained”), or from dismissal.   (For 
example, after seeing the offeror’s arguments, Government procuring activity agrees to 
re-do the A-76 cost comparison, thus rendering the protest academic.  GAO dismisses the 
protest as academic, but essentially the protestor has won the day at GAO.)  [Ref. 30]  
For these reasons, protests “dismissed” by GAO have been counted as Government wins 
or losses as applicable, depending on the circumstances surrounding the dismissal. 
 
C.  GAO CASE DATA AND GOVERNMENT WIN RATE INFORMATION 
The GAO case data is arrayed below using various parameters, showing the total 
number of protests, the number of protests won by the Government, the number of 
protests lost by the Government, and the resulting Government win rates.   
 
1.  All GAO A-76 Decisions (5 Feb 1996 to 23 Dec 2002)    
46 Total  27 Wins 19 Losses 59% Govt. win rate 
 
2.  By Procuring Agency/Agency Under Study 
13 USAF  6 Wins  7 Losses 46% Govt. win rate 
17 Navy  10 Wins 7 Losses 59% Govt. win rate 
12 Army  8 Wins  4 Losses 67% Govt. win rate 
1 DLA*  1 Win  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
1 DCA**  1 Win  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
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2.  By Procuring Agency/Agency Under Study (Con’t.) 
1 IHS ***  1 Win  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
1 DoD****  0 Wins  1 Loss  0% Govt. win rate 
(*Defense Logistics Agency/**Defense Commissary Agency/***Indian Health 
Service/****DoD Pentagon Heating and Refrigeration Plant) 
3.  By Study Type 
There are several methods for conducting an A-76 acquisition set forth in the 
OMB A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook (RSH.)  A “full study” is a formal A-76 
process in which a solicitation is issued, competitive private sector offers are received 
and analyzed, a potential contractor is selected, and then the contractor and Government 
in-house costs are compared.  The Government prepares a proposal for in-house 
performance known as the Management Plan.  The low evaluated price/cost (either 
Government Management Plan or contractor) is then selected for performance of the 
required services.  A “direct conversion” is normally used on smaller A-76 competitions, 
usually those involving ten or fewer civilian positions under study.  No solicitation is 
issued initially, and the Government does not prepare a formal Management Plan.  The 
procuring agency conducts a market survey of existing contract prices for similar work.  
This range of contract cost estimates is then compared to the estimated Government cost 
of in-house performance.  If the Government cost falls within or below the range of 
contract costs, performance remains in-house with Government employees.  If the 
Government cost falls above the range of contract costs, a determination is made to 
convert to contract performance.  The contract is then awarded using traditional methods.   
The GAO case data is arrayed by study type below.   
 
41 Full study  24 Wins 17 Losses 59% Govt. win rate 
2 Non A-76 RFPs* 1 Win  1 Loss  50% Govt. win rate 
1 Direct conversion 1 Win  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
2 Task Orders** 1 Win  1 Loss  50% Govt. win rate 
 22
(*Request For Proposal/**Order under existing contract – The RFPs and task 
orders were non-A-76 procurements challenged as violations of A-76 policies.) 
4. By Private Sector Source Selection Strategy 
The “contracting” portion of the A-76 process is somewhat similar to a normal 
acquisition, with private firms responding to the Government’s solicitation requirements.  
The private firm is usually selected via competitive procedures, although occasionally        
sole/single source preference programs such as the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act (for single-
source direct purchase from a non-profit workshop that employs the disabled) are used.   
There are three primary competitive evaluation methods for private contractor 
source selection that are utilized in A-76 acquisitions.  The first is the use of Invitation 
For Bids (IFB), under the procedures of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 
14.  The IFB method is characterized by public opening of priced bids.  Contractor 
selection is made on the basis of the low price received from a “responsible” firm (i.e. a 
firm that is judged to have sufficient capability, capacity, and finances to perform the 
contract) that has submitted a bid responsive to the solicitation requirements.   The 
second and third methods both utilize competitive negotiation techniques under the 
procedures of FAR Part 15.  The second competitive method is a negotiated procurement 
with selection of a firm based on the low priced technically acceptable (LPTA) offer.  
This technique allows consideration of selection criteria other than price (e.g. the 
relevance and quality of a company’s past performance on similar contracts), and permits 
discussions and proposal revisions to correct deficiencies, clarify ambiguities, and 
improve pricing.  To be eligible for selection, a proposal must be determined acceptable 
in the non-price technical factors included in the solicitation.  The third competitive 
method is use of a negotiated procurement with best value selection based on the firm 
offering the most favorable combination of price and technical merit, also known as 
trade-off.  The Contracting Officer determines the relative weight of the technical and 
price proposals, and the relative weight of factors within the technical proposal, and 
discloses these weights in the solicitation.  These best value trade-off techniques allow 
selection of other than the lowest price, using subjective judgment to evaluate various 
aspects of a firm’s technical background and expertise.  This third competitive source 
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selection method also permits discussions and proposal revisions to correct deficiencies, 
clarify ambiguities, and improve pricing.     
The GAO case data is arrayed by private sector source selection strategy below. 
30 Trade-Off  16 Wins 14 Losses 53% Govt. win rate 
10 LPTA  8 Wins  2 Losses 80% Govt. win rate 
4 IFB   2 Wins  2 Losses 50% Govt. win rate 
2 Sole Source* 1 Win  1 Loss  50% Govt. win rate 
(*One task order/one single source procurement under small disadvantaged 
business program) 
 
5.  By Year of Protest Action  
2 CY* 1996  2 Wins  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
1 CY 1997  1 Win   0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
4 CY 1998  4 Wins  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
5 CY 1999  3 Wins  2 Losses 60% Govt. win rate 
9 CY 2000  3 Wins  6 Losses 33% Govt. win rate 
11 CY 2001  5 Wins  6 Losses 45% Govt. win rate 
14 CY 2002  9 Wins  5 Losses 64% Govt. win rate 
(*calendar year) 
6.  By Protest Type 
There are two basic types of protests filed at GAO.  Pre-award protests generally 
involve challenges to the Government solicitation specifications, clauses, provisions, or 
source selection methodology (filed before the deadline for submission of bids or 
proposals), or else they involve challenges after submission of offers but prior to source 
selection, most often objections to the protestor’s exclusion from the competitive range.  
Award protests involve challenges to the contractor selection decision, filed by 
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unsuccessful offerors.  In A-76 acquisitions, award protests may also challenge the A-76 
Government versus contractor-challenger cost comparison decision, after the protestor 
first files an (unsuccessful) appeal to the A-76 administrative appeal authority.      
The GAO case data is arrayed by protest type below. 
37 Award protest 21 Wins 16 Losses 57% Govt. win rate 
9 Pre-award protest 6 Wins  3 Losses 67% Govt. win rate 
 
D.  ISSUE DATA AND GOVERNMENT WIN RATE INFORMATION 
The researcher conducted a brief initial examination of the A-76 bid protests, in 
order to ascertain what types of issues were contested at GAO.  This examination 
revealed that the issues could be categorized into several topical groupings for the 
purposes of review and analysis.  The issues contested in the A-76 protests will be 
grouped into five categories.  
 The first two issue categories are associated with issues related to A-76 
acquisitions. “A-76 Process” issues involve the policies and procedures unique to A-76 
competitions.  For example, in BAE Systems, GAO sustained a protest where it found that 
the procuring agency failed to determine that the Government Management Plan (MP) 
met the requirements of the performance work statement.  In IT Facility Services-Joint 
Venture, GAO denied a protest alleging conflict of interest due to the same support 
contractor assisting in both the preparation of the Government MP as well as the 
evaluation of private sector offers.  “A-76 Process - Balancing” issues involve the 
technical leveling or balancing step in the A-76 process (described in Chapter II, Section 
B.)  For example, in Aberdeen Technical Services, GAO sustained a protest where it 
found that the procuring agency failed to consider potential balancing of the Government 
MP with the private sector challenger firm.  In Integrity Management Enterprises, GAO 
denied the protest, stating that the procuring agency thoroughly reviewed the Government 
MP and private sector challenger technical submissions.  (The A-76 Process category 
does not include the A-76 Process - Balancing issues, or vice versa; they are distinct 
categories.)    
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The third and fourth issue categories cover matters not directly related to the A-76 
aspects of the acquisitions.  “Performance Work Statement (PWS)” issues are those 
related to the contact performance work statement (sometimes called the statement of 
work or SOW.)  For example, in ANV Enterprises, GAO denied a protest alleging that the 
PWS was ambiguous and thus unreasonably risky for potential contractors.  
“Contracting” issues are those related to other traditional (i.e. non-A-76) procurement 
issues, most often involving the technical and price/cost analysis of private sector 
offerors, or the contractor source selection decision.  For example, in Consolidated 
Engineering Services, GAO sustained a protest where the procuring agency failed to 
properly follow its evaluation scheme in determining the protestor unacceptable in past 
performance.  In Gemini, GAO denied the protest, finding that the procuring agency had 
the right to evaluate staffing proposals against an undisclosed staffing estimate.    
The fifth issue category, “Legal/GAO Procedural”, covers issues related to such 
legal process matters as timeliness of protest, GAO’s legal jurisdiction to hear a particular 
protest or issue, etc.  For example, in OMNI, GAO dismissed a protest against the private 
sector selection decision, requiring that the protestor first attend the procuring agency’s 
post-award debriefing before electing to file any protest.   
Many of the GAO cases involve multiple issues.  Thus, there are more issues (82) 
than protests (46). It is noted that GAO often rules on an issue-by-issue basis.  Therefore, 
in a single protest decision, the Government can win on certain issues and lose on other 
issues.  Of course, a Government loss on any single issue within a protest results in an 
overall GAO decision in favor of the protestor (i.e. a Government protest loss.)  [Ref. 46]    
The GAO case issue data is arrayed below, showing the total number of issues 
contested in the protest issue categories, the number of issues won by the Government, 
the number of issues lost by the Government, and the resulting Government win rates. 
 
1. A-76 Process Issues 
43 Total  25 Wins 18 Losses 58% Govt. win rate 
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2. A-76 Process – Balancing Issues 
10 Total  2 Wins  8 Losses 20% Govt. win rate 
 
3. PWS Issues 
3 Total   3 Wins  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
 
4. Contracting Issues 
18 Total  13 Wins 5 Losses 72% Govt. win rate 
 
5. Legal/GAO Procedural Issues 
8 Total   8 Wins  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
 
6. All Protest Issues – Cumulative Totals 
82 Total  51 Wins 31 Losses 62% Govt. win rate 
  
Table 3-1 - “Identification of Wins and Losses by GAO Case” shows a 
breakdown of issues, wins, and losses, for each of the 46 A-76 GAO protests discussed in 
this thesis.   
Appendix A contains a brief synopsis of each GAO bid protest analyzed by the 
researcher.  This appendix provides a short description of the issue/s contained in each 
protest, identifies the applicable issue categories, and provides GAO’s rulings on each 
issue and on each bid protest.      
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the data presentation, including an 
explanation of the parameters used to present the GAO bid protest case data.  It also 
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covered an explanation of the use of the Government win rate, and the criteria used by 
the researcher to define a Government protest win or loss.  This chapter further 
categorized the protest issues into five discrete categories.  The researcher presented the 
GAO protest case data, issue data, and Government win rates for each category. 































Aberdeen L L  L  3L 
AHNTECH    W  W 
AFGE     W W 
ANV   W   W 
BAE L 2L    3L 
BMAR W   L  W/L 
COBRO L L    2L 
Consolidated    L  L 
Crown/Health 2W     2W 
Crown/Supp.     W W 
Day-Zimm. W  W   2W 
Del-Jen 3L     3L 
DON (Navy) L     L 
DYNCORP L L    2L 
FPI     W W 
Gemini    W  W 
E.L. Hamm    W  W 
Imaging Sys. W/L     W/L 
IME 2W W    3W 
IT (2001) L     L 
IT (2002)    W  W 
IT Facility 3W   2W  5W 
J&E Assoc.    W  W 
Johnson(2/01)    L  L 
Johnson(11/01) 2W     2W 
Jones-Hill(’00)  L    L 
Jones-Hill(’01) 2L L    3L 
Lackland(7/01) L     L 
Lackland(12/01) W   W  2W 
LBM   W   W 
Madison W     W 
Morrison-Knu. L     L 
N&N Travel W   L  W/L 
NVT Tech. 3W     3W 
OMNI     W W 
Pacific Support 2W     2W 
PharmChem    W 3W 4W 
Rice (2000)  L    L 
Rice (2002)    W  W 
RTS Travel W     W 
Shaw    W  W 
Sodexho W/L W    2W/L 
S-W Anesthesia    W W 2W 
Symvionics 2W     2W 
TDF Corp. W   W  2W 
Trajen 3L     3L 
TOTALS 25W/18L 2W/8L 3W 13W/5L 8W 51W/31L 
 
(*Any one loss (“L”) results in an overall loss/decision against the Government.) 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the data that was presented in Chapter III.  
The researcher will first analyze the General Accounting Office (GAO) bid protest case 
data (i.e. that data arrayed on an overall case-by-case basis.)  The researcher will then 
analyze the issue data within each of the five issue categories (i.e. that data arrayed using 
the topical issue categories previously identified.)  Within each issue category, common 
themes, trends, and problems will be identified as applicable.   
 
B. ANALYSIS OF GAO CASE DATA  
1. All GAO A-76 Decisions 
The thesis identifies a total of 46 A-76 bid protests (or cases) decided by GAO 
during the period 5 February 1996 to 23 December 2002.  There were 27 wins and 19 
losses, resulting in a Government win rate of 59 percent:   
  
46 Total  27 Wins 19 Losses 59% Govt. win rate 
 
(The reader is reminded that the terms “Government win rate”, “win rate”, 
“Government win”, or “win” are defined to mean that the Government procuring agency 
successfully won or defended the protest.  These terms do NOT refer to which entity won 
the A-76 cost comparison, Government or contractor.)     
During the last several years, the overall Government win rate at GAO for all bid 
protest actions was approximately 80 percent.  [Ref. 72]  The government loses a 
significantly higher percentage of A-76 bid protests (41%) compared to its loss rate on all 
protests overall (20%.)     
The GAO case data is further examined below, to determine what effect (if any) 





2. By Study Type 
The total number of protests, the number of protests won by the Government, the 
number of protests lost by the Government, and the resulting Government win rates are 
shown below.   
 
41 Full study  24 Wins 17 Losses 59% Govt. win rate 
2 Non A-76 RFPs* 1 Win  1 Loss  50% Govt. win rate 
1 Direct conversion 1 Win  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
2 Task Orders** 1 Win  1 Loss  50% Govt. win rate  
(*Request For Proposal/**Order under existing contract)   
  
A full study is the formal A-76 process described in Chapter II, Section B.  The 
RFPs and task orders were non-A-76 procurements challenged as violations of A-76 
policies.  A direct conversion is essentially a normal (non-A-76) acquisition of services, 
conducted after an initial market survey results in the determination that performance by 
contract would be more economical than performance by in-house employees.  This 
technique is generally limited to A-76 studies involving ten or fewer civilian employees.  
[Ref. 64]   
The 59 percent Government win rate for full studies exactly mirrors the 
Government win rate for all the A-76 cases examined in this thesis.  There are an 
insufficient number of cases in the other three study type categories to derive statistically 
significant win rates.  
The study type thus has no observable effect on the Government win rate at GAO.   
 
3. By Protest Type 
The total number of protests, the number of protests won by the Government, the 
number of protests lost by the Government, and the resulting Government win rates are 
shown below. 
 
37 Award protest* 21 Wins 16 Losses 57% Govt. win rate 
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3. By Protest Type (con’t.)  
9 Pre-award protest** 6 Wins  3 Losses 67% Govt. win rate 
(*Protest against source selection or cost comparison decision) 
(**Protest against solicitation terms and conditions, or other prior to 
selection/decision)  
 
The 57 percent Government win rate for award protests closely approximates the 
Government win rate for all the A-76 cases examined in this thesis (59%.)   
Within the subset of pre-award protests, the Government has a better win rate 
(67%) compared to the win rate for A-76 protests overall (59%.)  In order to determine 
the cause of this relative success, an examination of the issues contested in the pre-award 
subset is useful.  The Pre-award protests generally involve challenges to the 
Government’s specifications, clauses, provisions, or source selection methodology (filed 
before the deadline for bids or proposals), or else they involve challenges after 
submission of offers but prior to source selection, most often objections to the protestor’s 
exclusion from the competitive range.  [Ref. 72]     
GAO has consistently held that the Government has broad authority and 
discretion to determine its own requirements, also known as the government’s “minimum 
needs.”  GAO will not normally question the procuring agency’s judgment in this regard, 
as long as the agency acts reasonably.  For example, in LBM, GAO found that the 
procuring agency acted reasonably in requiring that private sector offerors be certified to 
ISO 9000 quality standards prior to the commencement of contract services.  In ANV 
Enterprises, GAO denied a protest alleging that the performance work statement (PWS) 
was ambiguous and risky due to lack of detail.  GAO stated that the procuring agency 
disclosed all reasonably available information in its solicitation.  The Government 
normally is successful in winning these protests against solicitation terms and conditions.   
The other types of pre-award protests generally involve challenges after 
submission of offers but prior to source selection, most often objections to the protestor’s 
exclusion from the competitive range.  Results in these protests are mixed.  For example, 
in AHNTECH, GAO denied a protest that the protestor was improperly excluded from the 
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competition’s competitive range due to insufficient staffing.  GAO found that the 
procuring agency had the right to evaluate staffing against an undisclosed staffing 
estimate.  However, in N&N Travel & Tours, GAO sustained the protestor’s contention 
that it was improperly barred from competing, due to procuring agency’s issuance of a 
task order for the required services.   
Another way to examine the higher Government win rate in the protest type 
category is by use of the five protest issue categories identified in Chapter III.  The two 
issue categories unique to A-76 acquisitions, “A-76 Process Issues” and A-76 Process – 
Balancing Issues”, have relatively low Government win rates (58 percent and 20 percent 
respectively.)  The remaining three issue categories, those not directly related to A-76 
acquisitions, “PWS Issues”, “Contracting Issues”, and “Legal/GAO Procedural Issues”, 
have relatively high Government win rates (100 percent, 72 percent, and 100 percent 
respectively.)   
The researcher examined the issues contained within the award and pre-award 
subsets of the protest type category.  In the award protest subset, 69 percent of the issues 
contested (48 out of 70 issues) are either A-76 Process Issues or A-76 Process – 
Balancing Issues.  By contrast, in the pre-award protest subset, only 42 percent of the 
issues contested (five out of 12 issues) are either A-76 Process Issues or A-76 Process – 
Balancing Issues.  Thus, the relatively high Government win rate under pre-award A-76 
protests is due in part to the lower incidence of A-76 protest issues (i.e. those issues that 
the Government more often loses.)   
In summary, the 57 percent Government win rate for award protests closely 
approximates the Government win rate for all the A-76 cases examined in this thesis 
(59%.)  Conversely, for pre-award protests, the Government has a better win rate (67%) 
compared to the win rate for A-76 protests overall (59%.)  This higher win rate for pre-
award protests is attributable to a lower incidence of problematic A-76 issues, and a 
higher incidence of easily defended challenges to the Government’s determination of its 
minimum needs.   
4.  By Private Sector Source Selection Strategy 
The total number of protests, the number of protests won by the Government, the 
number of protests lost by the Government, and the resulting Government win rates are 
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shown below.  (Chapter III contains a detailed explanation of the various private sector 
source selection strategies utilized in A-76 acquisitions.)   
 
30 Trade-Off  16 Wins 14 Losses 53% Govt. win rate 
10 LPTA  8 Wins  2 Losses 80% Govt. win rate 
4 IFB   2 Wins  2 Losses 50% Govt. win rate 
2 Sole Source* 1 Win  1 Loss  50% Govt. win rate 
(*One task order/one single source procurement under small disadvantaged 
business program) 
 
There are an insufficient number of cases in the Invitation For Bid (IFB) and sole 
source subsets to derive statistically significant Government win rates. 
The 53 percent Government win rate for trade-off source selection reasonably   
approximates the Government win rate for all the A-76 cases examined in this thesis 
(59%.) 
The 80 percent Government win rate for low priced technically acceptable 
(LPTA) source selection is significantly higher than the Government win rate for all the 
A-76 cases examined in this thesis (59%), and significantly higher than the Government 
win rate for trade-off source selection (53%.)  The reasons for the high LPTA win rate 
are observable from an examination of the protest issues contested in each source 
selection strategy subset.  The Government’s lowest win rate by issue category occurs 
under A-76 Process – Balancing Issues (20%.)  These are the most difficult protest issues 
for the Government to win under A-76 acquisitions.  The potential for technical balancing 
generally occurs only under negotiated trade-off A-76 source selections.  Trade-off 
acquisition weights technical and price proposals, and encourages enhancements in 
performance and performance quality.  The presence or possible presence of technical 
enhancements in the private sector challenger’s proposal creates the need to examine the 
level of performance and performance quality in the Government MP, and possibly 
balance the MP against the contractor’s proposal.  Conversely, LPTA procurements have 
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little potential for balancing, given that private sector selection is made on the basis of 
low price.  In fact, all of the A-76 Process – Balancing Issues examined in this thesis 
occurred under trade-off source selection strategies.  Thus, the high LPTA Government 
win rate is driven in part by the absence of the most difficult protest issues (i.e. A-76 
Process – Balancing.)      
The researcher additionally examined the two unique A-76 protest issue 
categories (“A-76 Process Issues” and A-76 Process – Balancing Issues”) as a percentage 
of all protest issues contested in the LPTA and trade-off source selection categories.  As 
stated above, the Government win rates under these two A-76 issue categories are much 
lower than the win rates in the three other non-A-76 issue categories.  In the trade-off 
subset, 65 percent of the issues contested (35 out of 54 issues) are either A-76 Process 
Issues or A-76 Process – Balancing Issues.  By contrast, in the LPTA subset, only 59 
percent of the issues contested (ten out of 17 issues) are either A-76 Process Issues or A-
76 Process – Balancing Issues.  Thus, the relatively high Government win rate under 
LPTA A-76 protests is due in part to the lower incidence of A-76 protest issues (i.e. those 
issues that the Government more often loses.) 
In summary, the 53 percent Government win rate for trade-off source selection 
reasonably approximates the Government win rate for all the A-76 cases examined in this 
thesis (59%.)  Conversely, for LPTA source selection, the Government has a better win 
rate (80%) compared to the win rate for A-76 protests overall (59%.)  This higher win 
rate for LPTA source selection protests is attributable to a lower incidence of problematic 
A-76 issues, and particularly due to the absence of any A-76 Process – Balancing Issues.   
5.  By Procuring Agency/Agency Under Study 
The total number of protests, the number of protests won by the Government, the 
number of protests lost by the Government, and the resulting Government win rates are 
shown below. 
 
13 USAF  6 Wins  7 Losses 46% Govt. win rate 
17 Navy  10 Wins 7 Losses 59% Govt. win rate 
12 Army  8 Wins  4 Losses 67% Govt. win rate 
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5.  By Procuring Agency/Agency Under Study (con’t.) 
1 DLA*  1 Win  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
1 DCA**  1 Win  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
1 IHS ***  1 Win  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
1 DoD****  0 Wins  1 Loss  0% Govt. win rate 
(*Defense Logistics Agency/**Defense Commissary Agency/***Indian Health 
Service/****DoD Pentagon Heating and Refrigeration Plant) 
 
There are an insufficient number of cases in the DLA, DCA, IHS, and DoD 
subsets to derive statistically significant Government win rates. 
The 59 percent Government win rate for protests against Navy A-76 
procurements exactly mirrors the Government win rate for all the A-76 cases examined in 
this thesis (59%.)  The 46% Government win rate for protests against USAF A-76 
procurements is significantly lower than the Government win rate for all the A-76 cases 
examined (59%.)  The 67% Government win rate for protests against Army A-76 
procurements is significantly higher than the Government win rate for all the A-76 cases 
examined (59%.) 
The researcher cannot ascertain significant trends from the case parameter data to 
explain the differing win rates among Army, Navy, and USAF A-76 bid protests.  Each 
procuring agency has defended a variety of A-76 protests, consisting of a variety of study 
types, private sector source selection strategies, and protest types during the period 
examined.  Instead, the explanation for the varying win rates may be found in the protest 
issues contested within the cases.   
The researcher has again examined the two unique A-76 protest issue categories 
(“A-76 Process Issues” and A-76 Process – Balancing Issues”) as a percentage of all 
protest issues contested in the Army, Navy, and USAF A-76 bid protest categories.  As 
stated above, the Government win rates under these two A-76 issue categories are much 
lower than the win rates in the three other non-A-76 issue categories.  In the Army subset, 
only 29 percent of the issues contested (eight out of 28 issues) are either A-76 Process 
Issues or A-76 Process – Balancing Issues.  In the Navy subset, 71 percent of the issues 
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contested (20 out of 28 issues) are either A-76 Process Issues or A-76 Process – 
Balancing Issues.  In the USAF subset, 58 percent of the issues contested (19 out of 33 
issues) are either A-76 Process Issues or A-76 Process – Balancing Issues.  The relatively 
high Government win rate under Army A-76 protests is thus due in part to the lower 
incidence of A-76 protest issues (i.e. those issues that the Government more often loses.)  
However, the percentage of A-76 Process Issues and A-76 Process – Balancing Issues in 
the USAF cases does not explain why the USAF Government win rate (46%) is lower 
than the overall Government win rate for all the cases examined in this thesis (59%), and 
lower than the Navy’s win rate (59%.)   
In summary, the 59 percent Government win rate for protests against Navy A-76 
procurements exactly mirrors the Government win rate for all the A-76 cases examined in 
this thesis (59%.)  Conversely, in the Army procurements, the Government has a better 
win rate (67%) compared to the win rate for A-76 protests overall (59%.)  This higher 
win rate for Army protests is attributable to a much lower incidence of problematic A-76 
issues.  The reasons for the relatively low USAF win rate are not apparent from an 
examination of the issue categories.   
6.  By Year of Protest Action 
The total number of protests, the number of protests won by the Government, the 
number of protests lost by the Government, and the resulting Government win rates are 
shown below.   
 
2 CY* 1996  2 Wins  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
1 CY 1997  1 Win   0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
4 CY 1998  4 Wins  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
5 CY 1999  3 Wins  2 Losses 60% Govt. win rate 
9 CY 2000  3 Wins  6 Losses 33% Govt. win rate 
11 CY 2001  5 Wins  6 Losses 45% Govt. win rate 





The researcher has examined the two unique A-76 protest issue categories (“A-76 
Process Issues” and A-76 Process – Balancing Issues”) as a percentage of all protest 
issues contested in the bid protests in each year.  As stated above, the Government win 
rates under these two A-76 issue categories are much lower than the win rates in the three 
other non-A-76 issue categories.  The Government protest win rates by year of protest are 
shown below, along with the corresponding percentages of A-76 protest issues as a 
portion of all protest issues.    
 
2 CY 1996  100% win rate  67% (2 A-76 issues/ 3 total issues) 
1 CY 1997  100% win rate  100% (1 A-76 issue/ 1 total issue) 
4 CY 1998  100% win rate  0 % (0 A-76 issues/ 8 total issues) 
5 CY 1999  60% win rate  71% (5 A-76 issues/ 7 total issues) 
9 CY 2000  33% win rate  68% (13 A-76 issues/ 19 total issues) 
11 CY 2001  45% win rate  74% (14 A-76 issues/ 19 total issues) 
14 CY 2002  64% Govt. win rate 72% (18 A-76 issues/ 25 total issues) 
 
Calendar years 1996 and 1997 can be eliminated from statistical consideration 
due to the low number of cases and low number of issues in those years.  In 1998, the 
Government won all of the A-76 protests; this may be attributed to the absence of any of 
the problematic A-76 protest issues in those GAO cases.  In the cases from 1999 through 
2002, A-76 protest issues were contested.  The lower Government win rates in these 
years can be attributed to the presence of these more difficult (for the Government) A-76 
protest issues.  However, there is not an exact correlation between the percentage of A-76 
issues and the Government protest win rates during the four-year period.  Further insight 
may be gained from an examination of the A-76 Process – Balancing Issues present in 
each year’s cases.   
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A-76 Process – Balancing Issues are the most difficult issues for the Government 
to win (20% Government win rate.)  There were no A-76 Process – Balancing Issues 
contested in 1999.  In 2000 there were three A-76 Process – Balancing Issues contested, 
and four contested in 2001 (all seven of these issues were lost by the Government.)  The 
win rates in these years were lower than in 1999.  Although 2002 also saw three A-76 
Process – Balancing Issues contested, two of the three issues were won by the 
Government.  Thus, there is some correlation between the presence of A-76 Process – 
Balancing Issues (and the procuring agency’s success in defending protests on these 
issues) and the varying Government win rates over time.   
In summary, while no definitive results are apparent, the data suggest that the 
variations in the Government win rate over time is driven in large part by the percentage 
of the more difficult A-76 protest issues contested in each year.   
7.  Summary of Analysis of GAO Case Data 
The GAO case data were examined to determine what effect (if any) the various 
case parameters had on the outcome of the protest actions. 
The study type (full study, direct conversion, etc.) has no observable effect on the 
Government win rate at GAO.   
Under protest type (award or pre-award protest), the Government has a better win 
rate (67%) on pre-award protests compared to the win rate for A-76 protests overall 
(59%.)  This higher win rate for pre-award protests is attributable to a lower incidence of 
problematic A-76 issues, and a higher incidence of easily defended challenges to the 
Government’s determination of its minimum needs. 
Under the various private sector source selection strategies, the Government has a 
better win rate (80%) on LPTA source selection protests compared to the win rate for A-
76 protests overall (59%.)  This higher win rate for LPTA source selection protests is 
attributable to a lower incidence of problematic A-76 issues, and particularly due to the 
absence of any A-76 Process – Balancing Issues. 
Within the case data categories of protests by procuring agency and protests by 
year, the data suggest that the Government win rates are driven by the varying 
percentages of the more problematic A-76 protest issues, and not by the identity of the 
procuring agency that conducted the acquisition nor by the year of the protest.    
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Overall, the types of issues within the cases, and the difficulty in defending those 
various issues, drive the Government’s A-76 bid protest win rate.    
The next section in this chapter will analyze the specific issue data within each of 
the five issue categories (i.e. that data arrayed using the topical issue categories 
previously identified.)  Within each issue category, common themes, trends, and 
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C. ANALYSIS OF GAO ISSUE DATA 
1.  All GAO Issues 
The GAO issue data is arrayed below, showing the total number of issues 
contested in the protest issue categories, the number of issues won by the Government, 
the number of issues lost by the Government, and the resulting Government win rates. 
 
A-76 Process Issues 
43 Total  25 Wins 18 Losses 58% Govt. win rate 
 
A-76 Process – Balancing Issues 
10 Total  2 Wins  8 Losses 20% Govt. win rate 
 
PWS Issues 
3 Total   3 Wins  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
 
Contracting Issues 
18 Total  13 Wins 5 Losses 72% Govt. win rate 
 
Legal/GAO Procedural Issues 
8 Total   8 Wins  0 Losses 100% Govt. win rate 
 
All Protest Issues – Cumulative Totals 
82 Total  51 Wins 31 Losses 62% Govt. win rate 
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The 62 percent cumulative Government win rate for all issue categories closely 
approximates the Government win rate for all the A-76 bid protest cases examined in this 
thesis (59%.)  Both of these A-76 Government win rates are significantly lower than the 
overall Government win rate at GAO for all bid protest actions (approximately 80 
percent.)   
The two issue categories unique to A-76 acquisitions, “A-76 Process Issues” and 
A-76 Process – Balancing Issues”, have relatively low Government win rates (58 percent 
and 20 percent respectively.)  The remaining three issue categories, those not directly 
related to A-76 acquisitions, “PWS Issues”, “Contracting Issues”, and “Legal/GAO 
Procedural Issues”, have relatively high Government win rates (100 percent, 72 percent, 
and 100 percent respectively.)  Procuring agencies have had difficulty defending their 
actions in issues unique to A-76 procurements.  These two A-76 protest issue categories 
will be analyzed below.  The three non-A-76 protest issue categories will also be 
analyzed, to present a complete picture of all the issues contested at GAO under A-76 
acquisitions.  The categories will be analyzed via an examination of representative 
protests in each category.  The GAO cases applicable to each category (or in each topical 
grouping within a category where applicable) will generally be discussed in 
chronological order, as GAO often builds on its earlier decisions in deciding bid protests.  
Within each issue category or topical grouping, common themes, trends, and problems 
will be identified as applicable. 
2.  Analysis of A-76 Process Issues 
The researcher has defined A-76 Process Issues as those protest matters 
concerning the policies and procedures unique to A-76 acquisitions.  (The only 
exceptions are A-76 Process – Balancing issues, which are separately covered in Section 
C.3 below.)  A review of the A-76 Process Issues reveals that these issues can best be 
examined in four topical groupings:  issues related to Government Management (MP) 
compliance with the performance work statement (PWS) and proper costing of the MP; 
application of A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook (RSH) cost adjustment factors; 
applicability of A-76 rules, procedures and processes; and, ethics/conflict of interest 
considerations.  Each grouping is discussed below.   
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a.  Government Management Plan (MP) – Compliance with PWS 
and Proper Costing  
In Aberdeen, GAO first examined matters involving the Government 
Management Plan’s compliance with the PWS and proper costing of the Management 
Plan (MP.)  [Ref. 5]  The protestor alleged that the MP did not include the full costs of a 
program manager and other key personnel.  The procuring agency argued that the PWS 
required on-site key personnel, but not necessarily full-time personnel.  However, GAO 
noted that the PWS required key personnel to be on-site during normal operating hours, 
and interpreted that statement to mean full-time.  GAO ruled in favor of the protestor on 
this issue, finding that the MP did not include required staffing and the cost associated 
with that staffing.  In Trajen, the case turned on a debate over whether the Government 
MP failed to include two-thirds of one full-time equivalent (FTE) position to perform 
spot painting duties under an operation and maintenance requirement.  [Ref. 50]  GAO 
held that notwithstanding the procuring agency’s arguments to the contrary, there was no 
evidence in the MP that other proposed FTE were designated to perform spot painting, 
and found in favor of the protestor on this issue.    
In Crown Healthcare Laundry, GAO examined the procuring agency’s 
evaluation of an offer from another Government agency, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA.)  [Ref. 13]  The VA submitted an offer to perform work for the USAF under 
an interagency sharing agreement (similar to an inter-service support agreement (ISSA) 
within DoD), as permitted by the A-76 RSH.  Crown had been the incumbent contractor 
performing the services.  The procuring agency decided to allow the VA to perform the 
work based on the results of the A-76 cost comparison, which indicated that the VA 
would be lower cost.  Crown protested, alleging that the VA underestimated the effort 
(and thus the cost) to do the work.  The protestor specifically alleged that the VA 
understaffed the project, and also proposed fewer trucks than required by the PWS.  GAO 
stated that the PWS was performance based, such that each offeror could decide how to 
staff the work and how many laundry trucks it would use.  Thus, GAO found that the 
procuring agency reasonably accepted the VA estimates, and found in favor of the 
procuring agency on this issue.   
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In Imaging Systems, the protestor alleged that the Government MP did not 
consider all costs of Government in-house staffing in calculating the In-House Cost 
Estimate (IHCE.)  [Ref. 22]  GAO found in favor of the protestor on this issue, ruling that 
the MP intended to use in-house labor from remote locations (locations physically 
separate from the primary location of services), but failed to include the costs of that 
support.  GAO disagreed with the procuring agency’s contention that this existing 
supporting workforce could absorb the additional work without an increase in staffing, 
and that this effort therefore represented a sunk cost that did not have to be included in 
the IHCE.  In BAE, GAO stated that the Government MP did not meet PWS requirements 
regarding key personnel.  [Ref. 9]  Unlike Aberdeen, the key personnel issue in BAE was 
not the amount of staffing hours proposed, but rather whether the individuals proposed in 
the MP met the PWS requirements for education and experience.  The procuring agency 
argued that federal personnel and A-76 rules prohibited the MP from designating specific 
individuals.  GAO stated that these constraints did not alter the requirement for the MP to 
indicate compliance in all respects with the PWS, and sustained the protest on this issue.   
In Cobro, the protestor argued that private sector offerors and the 
Government MP were treated differently with respect to government-furnished facilities.  
[Ref. 11]  The solicitation failed to identify the government-furnished facilities that the 
activity intended to make available to the A-76 service provider, whether Government 
MP or private sector contractor.  The Government MP nevertheless assumed that it would 
have free use of the facilities, and accordingly did not include associated costs.  The 
protestor and other offerors were forced to include all facilities’ costs in their proposals.  
GAO ruled in favor of the protestor on this issue, stating that the procuring agency 
allowed the MP to compete on an unequal footing with private sector firms.   
In Johnson Controls [Nov. 23, 2001], one of the protestor’s major 
arguments was that the Government MP was deficient, in that the Government MP did 
not include sufficient staffing (and the associated costs) necessary to perform a number of 
PWS requirements.  [Ref. 29]  GAO stated, “It is not our Office’s role to determine the 
appropriate staffing level of either the in-house team or the private sector offeror.  
Instead, our role is to determine whether there was a reasonable basis for the agency’s 
determinations in this regard.”  [Ref. 29 p. 10]  Accordingly, GAO carefully reviewed the 
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procuring agency record regarding the MP’s logic in staffing and costing the requirement, 
including the review documentation of the Government administrative appeal authority.  
GAO denied the protest, stating that the procuring agency properly concluded that the 
MP had identified and cost all necessary Most Efficient Organization (MEO) positions.   
 In Jones/Hill Joint Venture [Dec. 5, 2001], the protestor alleged that the 
Government MP did not fully include all costs necessary to perform the PWS.  [Ref. 31]  
Similar to Imaging Systems, the MP intended to use supporting labor from personnel not 
included in the Government MEO.  In one case, the procuring agency argued that the 
non-MEO level of support was of nominal cost; GAO stated that the MP’s failure to 
include all costs caused an unfair cost comparison.  In other instances of non-MEO 
support, the procuring agency stated that the Government IHCE did in fact include the 
appropriate costs; however, GAO found no documentation in the procurement record that 
supported the agency’s assertion.    Accordingly, GAO sustained the protest.   
 In NVT, the protestor objected that the Government MP did not utilize 
standard material “plug-in costs” (i.e. estimated costs stated in the solicitation that all 
private sector offerors were required to utilize.)  [Ref. 38]  GAO stated that the 
Government MP did include material costs, calculated based on the solicitation’s 
historical workload, that were in fact higher than the material plug-in amounts.  The 
protestor also argued that the Government MP did not cost out all safety, quality, and 
repair PWS requirements.  GAO found that the protestor merely disagreed with the MEO 
staffing quantities and resulting IHCE costs calculated in the Government MP, and that 
the record supported that the MP did consider all PWS functions.  GAO denied the 
protest on these issues.   
 In Integrity Management, the protestor argued that the Government MP 
was not capable of performing the PWS and did not cover all necessary costs of 
performance.  [Ref. 23]  GAO found that the procuring agency’s source selection 
authority (SSA) sought the assistance of the technical evaluation board to insure that the 
Government MP was capable of performing.  The procurement file provided detailed 
documentation showing that the SSA carefully reviewed the MP to insure that the 
Government was fully capable of performing the PWS.  GAO denied the protest on this 
issue.  In Sodexho, in response to a protest alleging that the Government MP failed to 
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meet numerous PWS requirements, GAO found that the procuring agency properly 
evaluated the MP, that there was no basis to conclude that the MP failed to meet the 
PWS, and denied the protest on this issue.  [Ref. 46]   
 There are several themes common to a number of these protest issues 
related to the Government MP.  Most of the instances of alleged or actual MP non-
compliance revolve around sufficiency of staffing, not surprising for service efforts.  
However, within the staffing matters protested, problems with both key personnel 
requirements and with non-MEO support appear in several instances.  Key personnel 
requirements created problems with MP compliance regarding the number of hours 
proposed, and also created problems regarding the ability of proposed MP key personnel 
to meet PWS minimum standards for education and experience.  In several cases, the 
Government MP failed to account for supporting in-house staff within the MEO, or failed 
to include the costs of that non-MEO support in the Government IHCE.   
 Another theme that emerges is GAO’s focus on consistent treatment of the 
Government MP and the private sector challenger.  Both the Government MP and the 
private sector challenger must be held to the same PWS standards.  Regardless of 
whether the issue is related to staffing, government-furnished facilities, or other technical 
and cost issues, GAO requires that both parties in the A-76 competition be treated 
consistently to insure a fair Government versus contractor cost comparison.  This 
emphasis on fairness in the cost comparison phase (Government versus contractor) 
echoes GAO’s historical approach when evaluating competing private offers under non-
A-76 procurements.         
 GAO also makes clear that under a performance based PWS, the 
Government MP may be acceptable, even if it provides a very different staffing and 
technical approach from that of the private sector challenger.  This is consistent with 
GAO’s position that acceptable staffing levels and technical approaches may vary among 
private sector offerors as well.   
 Similar to traditional non-A-76 procurement, GAO’s decisions emphasize 
the need for the procuring agency to follow the evaluation scheme set forth in the 
solicitation, and to appropriately and thoroughly document its actions in the contract file.  
As part of that documentation, the GAO decisions clearly indicate that the procuring 
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agency’s SSA is fully responsible for insuring that the Government MP can meet PWS 
requirements, even though the A-76 RSH charges the requiring activity’s “Independent 
Review Officer (IRO)” with performing this function.   
b.  Application of A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook (RSH) 
Cost Adjustment Factors 
In Crown Healthcare Laundry, GAO addressed an allegation regarding the 
procuring agency’s application of a cost factor to the protestor’s proposal, representing 
the additional cost to the Government for contract administration should the contractor 
win the A-76 cost comparison.  [Ref. 13]  The A-76 RSH provides for the addition of this 
cost as an upward adjustment to the price/cost of the private sector challenger’s price.  
[Ref. 64]  The protestor alleged that the procuring agency should have also added the 
Government’s cost of contract administration to the cost of the successful offer from the 
Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA.)  The VA had submitted an offer to perform the 
services under an interagency sharing agreement (similar to an inter-service support 
agreement (ISSA) within DoD.)  The RSH states that when comparing ISSAs to other 
offers, costs such as contract administration must be taken into account to insure a fair 
comparison.  The procuring agency contended that the VA would do its own quality 
assurance, and that the cost of that administration was included within the VA’s price.  
GAO denied the protest, stating that the agency was proper in not adding the contract 
administration cost factor to the ISSA under these circumstances.   
 In Trajen, the protestor contended that the procuring agency made errors 
in the application and calculation of two A-76 RSH cost adjustment factors, the tax 
adjustment factor and one-time conversion costs.  [Ref. 50]  For tax adjustment, the RSH 
provides for a decrease to the private sector challenger’s evaluated price; the decrease 
amount represents the additional corporate income taxes that would accrue to the 
Government if a contract were awarded to the private sector firm.  [Ref. 64 p. 27]  
Appendix 4 of the RSH lists the tax rate factors by industry; the tax rate factor is 
multiplied by the proposed contract price to calculate the amount of downward 
adjustment.  The procuring agency utilized a 0.3% tax rate for petroleum products, 
whereas the protestor contended that a higher 0.5% tax rate for miscellaneous services 
was more appropriate, and would have resulted in a larger decrease to the protestor’s 
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price.  (The PWS covered operation and maintenance of the Defense Fuel Support Point 
Pearl Harbor.)  GAO found in favor of the protestor, because the lower tax rate was 
selected from a wholesale trade (product) classification, rather than from a services 
classification.  Regarding one-time conversion costs, the RSH provides for these costs to 
be added as an upward adjustment to the private sector challenger’s price; one-time 
conversion costs typically include such expenses as transfer of government-furnished 
material and severance pay for displaced Government employees.  GAO also ruled in 
favor of the protestor on this issue, stating that the Government administrative appeal 
authority improperly overstated the one-time conversion costs by including the relocation 
cost of one military full-time equivalent (FTE), in addition to two civilian positions.  The 
A-76 RSH does not permit military personnel relocation expenses to be included in one-
time conversion costs.   
In Day Zimmerman, the protestor alleged that a solicitation requirement 
for private offerors to include insurance costs was unfair, given that the Government MP 
did not have to include such costs.  [Ref. 15]  GAO stated that the Government is self-
insured (and thus incurs no premium costs), and that the A-76 RSH takes this into 
account by requiring that the MP include a cost addition factor to account for this 
discrepancy.  The MP did include the cost addition factor for insurance.  Accordingly, 
GAO denied the protest.  In DynCorp, the protestor alleged that the agency improperly 
evaluated the cost of government furnished material.  [Ref. 18]  GAO sustained the 
protest on this issue, stating that the procuring agency allowed the Government IHCE to 
deduct the cost value of government furnished material, without the agency making the 
required corresponding downward adjustment to the protestor’s cost.   
In NVT Technologies, the protestor argued that the contract administration 
adjustment costs added to the protestor’s price were too high, due to use of an excessive 
employee grade structure and mix for the Government’s contract administration team.  
[Ref. 38]  The A-76 RSH provides for the addition of contract administration costs as an 
upward adjustment to the price/cost of the private sector challenger’s price.  The RSH 
provides a table that allocates the allowable number of contract administration personnel, 
based on the size (number of FTE) of the Government MEO.  However, the RSH permits 
the requiring activity to determine the appropriate grade structure for contract 
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administration personnel, and does not dictate the salary portion of the equation.  GAO 
stated that the protestor merely questioned the judgment of the procuring agency, but did 
not show that the agency’s explanation of the grade structure utilized was unreasonable.  
Therefore, GAO ruled in favor of the procuring agency on this issue.  In Del-Jen, the 
protestor successfully argued that the procuring agency improperly overstated the number 
of contract administration personnel, and thus overstated the contract administration costs 
that were added to the protestor’s price.  [Ref. 16]   
In these A-76 RSH cost adjustment issues, GAO again considered whether 
or not the procuring agency treated the Government MP and the private sector challenger 
consistently and fairly.  In Day Zimmerman, GAO found that the procuring agency 
assessed insurance costs for both the MP and the private sector challenger, and denied the 
protest.  In DynCorp, GAO sustained the protest, finding that the procuring agency 
allowed only the Government MP the cost reduction benefit related to government 
furnished material.     
The other major theme is GAO’s examination of whether or not the 
procuring agency followed required processes in calculating and applying the various 
cost adjustment factors, and whether or not any required subjective judgments were 
reasonably based and coherently recorded in the contract file.   
c.  Applicability of A-76 Rules, Procedures and Processes  
In Madison, the protestor alleged that the procuring agency violated the A-
76 process by allowing the Government MP team to change its IHCE after the agency 
evaluated the protestor’s proposal.  [Ref. 35]  The procuring agency first evaluated 
private sector proposals, held two rounds of discussions, and decided that Madison’s 
proposal represented the best value private sector offer.  After selecting Madison as the 
private sector challenger, the procuring agency turned to an evaluation of the 
Government MP.  The agency’s review of the Government IHCE revealed that the IHCE 
failed to include the costs of required material and supplies.  The procuring agency 
requested that the Government MP team make necessary changes and add increased costs 
to cover the costs of material and supplies.  The protestor alleged that the agency 
“gamed” the process by first reviewing the protestor’s proposal, then adding insufficient 
material and supply costs to the MP, such that the MP remained the low evaluated price.  
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[Ref. 35 p. 3]  GAO stated that the procuring agency properly allowed the correction of a 
simple mistake in the IHCE, and found no evidence that the agency improperly used any 
insights gained from its review of the protestor’s proposal.   
In Symvionics, the protestor contested two issues in this topical grouping.  
[Ref. 48]  First, the protestor alleged that the procuring agency failed to properly seal the 
Government MP in accordance with guidelines in the A-76 RSH.  The RSH requires that 
the Government MP be placed in a sealed enveloped and submitted to the contracting 
officer prior to the deadline for receipt of offers.  [Ref. 64 p. 11]  The MP remains sealed 
until after the private sector challenger is selected.  GAO found that although the MP was 
mishandled and not placed in a sealed envelope/container, it was otherwise properly 
completed, secured, and unaltered prior to the receipt and evaluation of the protestor’s 
proposal.  Therefore, the protestor was not prejudiced by the procuring agency’s failure 
to follow the prescribed safeguarding procedure, and GAO denied the protest on this 
issue.  In the second issue contested, the protestor stated that the Government 
administrative appeal authority improperly allowed the Government MEO to replace 
unallowable volunteer labor with proper appropriated fund personnel.  In response to an 
earlier appeal challenge, the administrative appeal authority required the Government MP 
team to replace the volunteer labor with appropriated fund personnel, and include those 
costs in the Government IHCE.  GAO stated that the procuring agency acted properly in 
allowing the MP correction, and appropriately calculated the amount of replacement 
labor necessary.  Thus, GAO also denied the protest on this second issue.       
In BMAR & Associates, the protestor contended that the Government MP 
failed to include a Technical Performance Plan (TPP) under a two-step sealed bid A-76 
procurement.  [Ref. 10]  The TPP is one of four parts of the complete Government MP, 
which also includes the Most Efficient Organization (MEO), Transition Plan (TP), and 
In-House Cost Estimate (IHCE.)  The TPP describes how the MEO will meet the 
requirements of the PWS.  GAO denied the protest on this issue, finding that a TPP is 
only required in a negotiated A-76 acquisition, in accordance with provisions of the 
Revised Supplemental Handbook (RSH.)  (The MP in a sealed bid procurement must 
include the MEO, TP, and IHCE however.)  In RTS Travel, the protestor alleged that the 
agency improperly determined that in-house performance was more economical under a 
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direct conversion process (utilizing a market survey of existing contract prices in lieu of 
conducting a full A-76 cost study.)  [Ref. 44]  RTS essentially argued that a full A-76 
cost comparison study should have been conducted, stating that no Government MP or 
MEO was prepared.  GAO denied the protest, finding that the procuring agency followed 
proper procedures in conducting the A-76 direct conversion process, and that the direct 
conversion met the conditions for use (i.e. the A-76 study involved ten or less civilian 
positions.)   
In N&N Travel, the protestor argued that issuance of a task order under a 
pre-existing contract violated A-76 policy, in that a competitive solicitation under A-76 
procedures should have been issued.  [Ref. 37]  GAO denied the protest, stating that it 
had no basis to question the procuring agency’s failure to utilize A-76 procedures, as no 
competitive solicitation was issued.  In Imaging Systems, the protestor alleged that the 
procuring agency failed to utilize A-76 procedures, where the agency cancelled a non-A-
76 solicitation after determining that in-house personnel could perform the work at less 
cost.  [Ref. 22]  GAO stated that non-use of A-76 may have violated agency policy, but 
given that the solicitation was not issued under A-76 procedures, there was no valid basis 
for this aspect of the protest.  GAO therefore denied the protest, stating that the non-use 
of A-76 procedures was a matter of executive branch policy, rather than a matter of 
procurement impropriety.   
In Lackland 21st Century [Dec. 4, 2001], the protestor contended that it 
was improper for the procuring agency to utilize its in-house audit staff to review the cost 
comparison steps and calculations (Government MP versus private sector challenger), 
before proceeding to a cost comparison decision.  [Ref. 33]  GAO found nothing 
improper in the agency’s actions, especially considering that the acquisition had already 
been protested on an earlier occasion.  In Sodexho, the protestor contended that the 
Government MP improperly used Government non-appropriated fund (NAFI) personnel 
for 80% of the MEO positions.  [Ref. 46]  GAO stated that because NAFI employees 
receive lower wages and fringe benefits than normal appropriated fund Government 
personnel, the procuring agency had a duty to disclose the MEO’s use of NAFI 
employees to private sector offerors.  Lack of such disclosure created an unfair 
competition, and GAO accordingly sustained the protest on this issue.  GAO particularly 
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based its decision on its interpretation of the A-76 RSH regarding the type of 
Government employees normally utilized in the Government MEO.  GAO concluded that 
the RSH does not preclude the use of NAFI employees.  However, based on numerous 
RSH references to normal appropriated fund Government personnel in general schedule 
(GS) and wage grade (WG) categories, GAO found that industry could reasonably expect 
to be competing against appropriated fund employees (and their attendant costs) absent 
any notification to the contrary. The high percentage of lower-cost NAFI employees in 
the MEO, without notification to industry, prejudiced the A-76 competition.   
Two types of protest issues are included in this topical grouping.  The first 
relates to the overall applicability of the A-76 policy to specific Government acquisitions.  
GAO has generally allowed the executive agencies to determine applicability.  In both 
N&N Travel and Imaging Systems, GAO did not question or overrule the agencies’ 
decision to not use A-76 procedures.   
The second set of issues relates to the proper application of various A-76 
rules, practices, and policies, within acquisitions that were processed under A-76 
procedures.  GAO examined the cases to insure that procedures set forth in the RSH were 
properly followed.  For example, in RTS Travel, GAO found that the procuring agency 
followed A-76 RSH guidelines in conducting a direct conversion.  In BMAR & 
Associates, GAO stated that the procuring agency correctly interpreted the RSH, in not 
requiring a Government TPP under two-step sealed bidding.  GAO also allowed the 
procuring agency some room for flexibility and took a common-sense approach in several 
cases.  In Madison, GAO found that the agency acted properly in allowing the 
Government MP team to correct a mistake in the IHCE.  In Symvionics, GAO noted that 
although the procuring agency failed to insure that the Government MP was properly 
sealed, the agency nevertheless safeguarded the information throughout the private sector 
evaluation process.  In both Symvionics and Sodexho, GAO carefully considered whether 
the procuring agency’s actions created an unfair competition, or caused an inconsistency 
in the treatment of the private sector challenger compared to the Government MP.   
d.   Ethics/Conflict of Interest Considerations 
In Morrison Knudsen, GAO first reviewed a protest alleging conflict of 
interest within the process of conducting an A-76 acquisition.  [Ref. 36]  The procuring 
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agency’s technical evaluation team, charged with evaluating private sector offers, 
included 14 evaluators (out of 16 total) who held positions that were under study via the 
same A-76 acquisition.  The procuring agency argued that it took steps to mitigate the 
conflict, including the assignment of a procurement analyst not under study as team chief, 
and increased oversight by the Contracting Officer.  However, the Contracting Officer 
admitted to GAO that he had realized the potential for conflict of interest, but that no 
other personnel with the required subject matter knowledge of the PWS were available.  
[Ref. 36 p. 3]  GAO stated that the conflict was significant, and was analogous to an 
offeror evaluating a competitor.  Because the 14 employees would lose their Government 
jobs in the event of a contractor A-76 victory, they had a powerful incentive to 
downgrade any potential private sector challenger.  In fact, both of the private offerors 
who responded to the solicitation were determined to be technically unacceptable.  GAO 
found an obvious conflict of interest that tainted the procuring agency’s determination 
that all private sector offers were unacceptable, and sustained the protest on this issue.    
In IT Facility Services, the protestor alleged conflict of interest based on 
several aspects of the membership of the source selection evaluation board (SSEB), 
charged with evaluating private sector offers.  [Ref. 26]   Four of the seven SSEB 
evaluators were employed within the functional departments of the activity undergoing 
A-76 study.  GAO found no conflict and thus denied the protest on this issue, because the 
positions of the employees in question were not included in the A-76 study (although the 
employees were located in the functional department being studied.)  These employees 
were not in danger of losing their jobs as a consequence of the A-76 study.  The protestor 
also alleged conflict based on the fact that the spouse of one of the SSEB evaluators was 
employed in a position undergoing A-76 study.  The spouse was in a position to lose 
his/her job.  GAO stated that an appearance of conflict of interest did exist.  However, 
SSEB evaluation worksheets showed that if that evaluator’s rating were eliminated, the 
protestor would still have been rated technically unacceptable.  GAO also stated that the 
procurement record contained no evidence that the evaluator in question influenced the 
other SSEB evaluators.  Thus, the protestor was not harmed by the conflict of interest, 
and GAO denied the protest on this issue as well.  This protestor also alleged that the 
procuring agency’s use of the same support contractor to assist in both the preparation of 
 54
the Government’s MP as well as the evaluation of private sector offers was improper.  
GAO found that the support contractor had implemented adequate “firewall” protection 
(i.e. the support contractor utilized different personnel for the two support tasks and did 
not allow information to pass from either group to the other.)  Accordingly, GAO denied 
the protest on this issue.   
In TDF Corp., the protestor contended that a conflict of interest was 
created by the presence on the technical evaluation team of two Government employees 
from the functional area that was undergoing the A-76 study.  [Ref. 49]  GAO noted that 
the two employees’ positions were designated as inherently governmental, and thus 
exempt from the study.  Therefore these employees’ jobs were not at risk.  GAO found no 
evidence that the procuring agency’s evaluation of the protestor’s proposal was improper, 
nor did GAO find any evidence that the protestor was prejudiced by any potential conflict 
of interest.  GAO therefore denied the protest on this issue.   
In Jones/Hill [Dec. 5, 2001], the protestor argued that the presence of the 
same Government employees and support contractor personnel on both the PWS team 
and the Government MP team constituted a conflict of interest.  [Ref. 31]  GAO sustained 
the protest, finding that the Government MP team had an unfair competitive advantage 
due to the information available to those MP team members who also participated in the 
PWS team.  This decision created considerable controversy in the A-76 community.  
Previously, Government and support contractor employees routinely sat on both the PWS 
team and the MP team.  The PWS and MP development processes were seen as 
synergistic.  Examination of historical workload data collected during the PWS 
development phase might help the activity envision a more efficient approach to 
workload management.  That efficiency could then be captured in the MP/MEO.  
Conversely, the MP team, while formulating the MP/MEO, might develop a new process 
considered so important or essential that the activity would choose to incorporate that 
process as a PWS requirement.  GAO cited the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
rules regarding conflicts of interest in determining that such conflicts were present in this 
case, stating that the procuring agency’s actions gave the Government MP team 
information not available to private sector offerors.  [Ref. 31 p. 6]     
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In Department of the Navy – Reconsideration [Jones-Hill], the Navy 
asked GAO to reconsider its earlier determination that the presence of the same 
Government employees and support contractor personnel on both the PWS team and the 
Government MP team constituted a conflict of interest.  [Ref. 17]  GAO affirmed its 
earlier decision that a conflict of interest was present, rejecting the procuring agency’s 
argument that FAR procurement conflict provisions were not applicable to the 
Government MP, as the MP team was not a private sector offeror.  However, GAO did 
modify its earlier decision, such that the revised conflict of interest standards would only 
be applied to A-76 procurements conducted after GAO’s initial conflict of interest ruling.   
There are several common themes that run through the protests in this 
topical grouping.  Both Government employees conducting A-76 studies, as well as the 
support contractors who assist them, are bound by FAR conflict of interest rules.  GAO 
first looks to see if a conflict or an appearance of conflict is present.  If so, GAO then 
goes on to consider whether or not the protestor was impacted or harmed as a result.   
GAO’s decision in Morrison Knudsen clearly established that employees 
whose jobs were undergoing A-76 study could not participate in the evaluation of private 
sector proposals.  However, in IT Facility Services and TDF Corp., GAO found no 
conflict where the Government employee technical evaluators were in the department 
being studied, but were not in direct danger of losing their jobs.  GAO also established 
that the same individual/s could not serve on both the PWS team and the Government MP 
team.   
3.  Analysis of A-76 Process – Balancing Issues 
The researcher has defined A-76 Process – Balancing Issues as those protest 
matters concerning the technical leveling or balancing step in the A-76 process.  Many A-
76 procurements use best value trade-off techniques to select the private sector 
challenger, allowing the SSA to select other than the lowest-priced private firm.  
However, the A-76 procedures then require a low-price decision to select between the 
contractor and the Government proposals.  [Ref. 64]  Because the potential exists under 
best value for the contractor challenger to offer excesses or enhancements above PWS 
requirements (enhancements which may have increased the firm’s costs), the contractor 
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and Government technical proposals must be examined to insure that they offer the same 
levels of performance and performance quality.  [Ref. 64]  If the contractor has higher 
performance or quality, the SSA must require that the Government Management Plan 
(MP) increase performance to the same levels, and increase its price if necessary as well.  
In theory at least, this insures a fair price-only cost comparison.  The actions of 
examining the Government and contractor technical proposals, and possible increases on 
the Government side, are known as “balancing” or “technical leveling.”  Pertinent cases 
are discussed below.   
In Aberdeen, the protestor argued that the procuring agency failed to consider 
potential balancing of the Government MP against the private sector challenger firm.  
[Ref. 5]  GAO sustained the protest on this issue, finding that the procuring agency failed 
to consider the levels of performance and performance quality of the MP and private 
sector challenger firm.  The procuring agency admitted that it failed to perform this step.  
In Rice Services [June 29, 2000], the protestor alleged that the procuring agency failed to 
properly conduct technical balancing of the Government MP against the protestor’s 
technical proposal.  [Ref. 42]  GAO stated that the procuring agency noted many 
technical enhancements during its evaluation of the protestor’s proposal.  However, when 
requested by the contracting officer to compare the levels of performance quality, the 
technical evaluation team stated that it found no differences between the Government MP 
and the protestor’s proposal.  GAO found that the procuring agency’s generic explanation 
in this regard was insufficient, given that the procurement record had documented many 
specific excesses in the protestor’s offer.  Thus, GAO sustained the protest on this issue.        
In BAE Systems, the protestor contended that the procuring agency failed to 
consider the protestor’s increases to the performance standards of the PWS.  [Ref. 9]  
GAO stated that the procuring agency failed to consider whether the protestor’s offer to 
improve the timeliness of service to walk-in customers (within 15 minutes, vice the 30 
minute PWS requirement) was an improvement to performance.  The procuring agency 
therefore failed to determine whether or not balancing was required in this instance.  
GAO accordingly sustained the protest on this issue.  The protestor also alleged that the 
Government administrative appeal authority’s later upward adjustments to the MEO 
staffing were improper.  GAO found that although the administrative appeal authority (in 
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reviewing the procuring agency’s actions) did conduct technical balancing, it did not 
document the basis for the amount of staffing that was added.   Thus GAO sustained the 
protest on this issue as well.   
In DynCorp, the protestor contended that the procuring agency did not properly 
consider the protestor’s accelerated performance schedule.  [Ref. 18]  GAO sustained the 
protest on this issue, finding that the procuring agency did not properly consider the 
impact of the acceleration as a possible increase in performance that might necessitate 
technical balancing.  GAO stated that the agency’s generic statement regarding balancing 
was insufficient file documentation.  In Jones/Hill [Dec. 5, 2001], the protestor alleged 
that the Government MP did not offer the same level of performance and performance 
quality as the protestor’s proposal.  [Ref. 31]  GAO found that several enhancements 
identified in the evaluation of the protestor’s technical proposal were not considered 
during the balancing phase of the cost comparison, and thus sustained the protest on this 
issue.   
The final two A-76 Process – Balancing protests are the only cases in which the 
procuring agency (the Navy in both procurements) successfully defended against protests 
related to technical balancing.  In Integrity Management, the protestor argued that its 
proposal provided a higher level of performance than the Government MP.  [Ref. 23]  
GAO denied the protest on this issue, stating that the procuring agency thoroughly 
reviewed both the Government MP and the private sector challenger technical 
submissions, and properly concluded that no technical balancing was required.  In 
Sodexho, the protestor contended that the procuring agency did not properly adjust the 
Government MP during the technical balancing phase.  [Ref. 46]  GAO found that the 
procuring agency appropriately documented the differences between the MP and the 
protestor’s proposal, and reasonably concluded that the differences did not constitute 
protestor improvements to performance or performance quality.  GAO therefore denied 
the protest on this issue.   
Several common themes can be seen in these protests.  In a number of cases, the 
procuring agency failed to follow the required A-76 RSH balancing process, either 
completely failing to consider the need for balancing, or failing to consider the potential 
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impact of private sector challenger enhancements in performing the balancing step.  In 
some cases, the agency did not properly document and support the analysis and rationale 
utilized in the balancing phase. 
The Integrity Management and Sodexho protests provide a sharp counterpoint.  In 
each of these acquisitions, the procuring agency fully considered the need for technical 
balancing.  The agency’s written analysis thoroughly documented its leveling review and 
the rationale for the conclusions reached.  In Integrity Management, the SSA specifically 
advised the (eventual) protestor during discussions that he found no evidence of increases 
in performance or performance quality beyond that required by the PWS, giving the firm 
the opportunity to rebut the SSA’s position, and/or improve the firm’s technical proposal.  
[Ref. 23 p. 5]    
4.  Analysis of PWS Issues 
The researcher has defined PWS Issues as those traditional (i.e. non-A-76) protest 
matters related to the performance work statement (PWS), sometimes referred to as the 
statement of work (SOW.)  Pertinent cases are discussed below.   
In ANV Enterprises, the protestor alleged that the PWS was ambiguous due to 
lack of detail, and risky due to the failure of the solicitation to offer equipment as 
Government-furnished.  [Ref. 8]  GAO denied the protest on this issue, finding that the 
procuring agency disclosed all available information, and was not required to offer 
Government-furnished equipment merely to reduce potential contractor risk.  In LBM, the 
protestor objected to the solicitation requirement that private offerors must be certified to 
ISO-9000 quality standards not later than the start date of contract services.  [Ref. 34]  
GAO denied the protest on this issue, finding that the procuring agency acted reasonably 
in imposing the quality requirement, given that the PWS required the service provider to 
move and refuel aircraft.  In Day Zimmerman, the protestor contended that the 
prospective contractor should be granted special indemnity protection due to the 
hazardous nature of the work (ordnance handling.)  [Ref. 15]  GAO stated that it is within 
the procuring agency’s discretion to determine whether the risk warrants such protection, 
and denied the protest. 
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These PWS cases all reflect GAO’s historical willingness to allow an agency to 
determine its own minimum needs.  The procuring agency must act reasonably in 
allocating risk and disclose all pertinent information in its solicitation.   
5.  Analysis of Contracting Issues 
The researcher has defined Contracting Issues as those protest matters related to 
traditional (i.e. non-A-76) procurement issues, other than those covered under PWS 
Issues above.  Pertinent cases are discussed below. 
In J&E Associates, the protestor argued that its technical proposal was 
misevaluated, resulting in the selection of another firm as private sector challenger in the 
A-76 competition.  [Ref. 27]  The protestor contended that the procuring agency 
improperly downgraded its proposal in the areas of organizational structure and staffing 
plan.  GAO denied the protest on this issue.  GAO found that the procuring agency’s 
evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation factors disclosed in the 
solicitation.  In PharmChem, the protestor alleged that the procuring agency improperly 
evaluated private sector technical proposals, arguing that its own offer was improperly 
downgraded, and that a competitor’s offer was rated too high.  [Ref. 41]  GAO denied the 
protest on this issue, finding that the procuring agency properly evaluated proposals in 
accordance with the solicitation criteria.   
In Gemini, the protestor argued that the procuring agency improperly evaluated 
the protestor’s staffing against an undisclosed (in the solicitation) staffing estimate.  [Ref. 
20]  GAO stated that the procuring agency had the right to use an undisclosed staffing 
estimate for evaluation, given that the solicitation notified offerors that staffing would be 
evaluated, and given that the procuring agency did consider the unique features of the 
protestor’s proposal in assessing the firm’s staffing approach.  GAO accordingly denied 
the protest on this issue.  In IT Facility Services, the protestor objected to the procuring 
agency’s determination that the protestor’s staffing was insufficient.  [Ref. 26]  GAO 
stated that the procuring agency acted reasonably in assessing the protestor’s staffing and 
approach to performing the PWS, and denied the protest on this issue.  The protestor also 
alleged that the procuring agency did not conduct adequate discussions regarding the 
protestor’s insufficient staffing.  GAO denied the protest on this issue as well, finding 
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that the procuring agency conducted meaningful discussions, and that the agency was not 
required to reopen discussions when the protestor’s staffing remained insufficient after 
final proposal revisions.   
In Johnson Controls [Feb. 13, 2001], the protestor alleged that the private sector 
firm selected for contact award had an unfair competitive advantage.  [Ref. 28]  GAO 
found that the successful firm had a proposed subcontractor who had inside information 
regarding the instant acquisition, based on that subcontractor’s previous work on a 
different Government contract for related services.  GAO stated that the procuring agency 
took no action to mitigate the imbalance, and therefore sustained the protest on this issue.  
In AHNTECH, the protestor contended that the procuring agency improperly eliminated 
the protestor from the competitive range due to insufficient staffing.  [Ref. 6]  GAO 
denied the protest on this issue, finding that the agency had the right to evaluate staffing 
against an undisclosed staffing estimate.  In Consolidated Engineering, the protestor 
argued against the elimination of its proposal due to the procuring agency’s assignment 
of a poor past performance rating.   [Ref. 12]  GAO found that the procuring agency had 
assigned a rating of “little confidence” to the protestor’s past performance.  However, the 
agency later admitted that the “little confidence” rating amounted to an acceptable rating 
in the evaluation scheme used, and had no coherent explanation as to why the protestor’s 
proposal was eliminated on that basis.  [Ref. 12 p. 9]  GAO accordingly sustained the 
protest on this issue.     
In these contracting cases, GAO reiterated some of its common standards used to 
assess the propriety of the procuring agency’s actions.  GAO examines each case to 
determine if the agency evaluated proposals in the manner that was communicated to 
industry in the solicitation, and if the protestor was treated fairly and consistently in the 
evaluation process.  In J&E Associates and in PharmChem, GAO found that the 
procuring agency followed the solicitation evaluation criteria, and evaluated offers in a 
reasonable and consistent manner.  Conversely, in Consolidated Engineering, the 
procuring agency failed to follow its own evaluation scheme, resulting in a protest loss 
for the Government.   
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Another common theme in these cases is the high incidence of protests over the 
evaluation of private sector staffing proposals.  GAO established that the procuring 
agency had the right to evaluate proposed staffing against an undisclosed Government 
staffing estimate, provided that the solicitation cited staffing as an evaluation factor.  
GAO also considered whether or not the agency properly considered any differences or 
unique features in a firm’s staffing and approach, in assessing whether the amount of 
staffing proposed was sufficient to perform the PWS requirements.  (In a performance 
based PWS, the procuring agency does not mandate overall staffing levels, nor disclose 
its estimate of needed staffing.  Rather, the PWS includes required tasks and performance 
standards, and the solicitation directs the Government MP and private sector offerors to 
propose staffing that they believe is necessary to perform the services.)   
6.  Analysis of Legal/GAO Procedural Issues 
The researcher has defined Legal/GAO Procedural Issues as those protest matters 
related to legal process considerations, such as the timeliness of the protest or GAO’s 
legal jurisdiction to hear a particular protest or issue.  Pertinent cases are discussed 
below.   
In PharmChem, the protestor objected to the procuring agency’s use of non-cost 
factors to select the private sector challenger in an A-76 competition.  [Ref. 41]    GAO 
stated that the protest was untimely, as the protestor had a duty to object to the 
solicitation provisions prior to the closing deadline for receipt of offers.  The protestor 
also alleged that the procuring agency violated A-76 rules in not determining the existing 
contract price unreasonable, before proceeding with an A-76 acquisition for the same 
services.  GAO stated that the protest was untimely on this issue as well, as the protestor 
had a duty to object to the issuance of the A-76 solicitation prior to the closing deadline. 
GAO thus denied the protests on both of these issues.  This same protestor further 
contended that the procuring agency failed to utilize best value trade off criteria in 
conducting the Government MP versus private sector challenger cost comparison.  GAO 
found that the protestor was not an interested party on this issue, as it was not the 
successful private sector offeror, and therefore was not permitted to file a protest on this 
basis.  Accordingly, GAO denied the protest on this issue.  (GAO will not sustain a 
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protest unless the protestor was prejudiced by the procuring agency’s actions.  [Ref. 41]  
In PharmChem’s case, even if GAO had found that the procuring agency improperly 
conducted the Government MP versus private sector challenger cost comparison, 
PharmChem would not stand to benefit (i.e. gain a chance for contract award.)  
PharmChem was not the firm selected as the private sector challenger, and would not 
have any chance of being selected as such regardless of the propriety of the cost 
comparison.)     
In Omni, the protestor alleged that the procuring agency conducted misleading 
discussions, resulting in the selection of a different firm as the private sector challenger in 
an A-76 acquisition.  [Ref. 39]  GAO dismissed the protest, stating that the protestor must 
first attend the procuring agency’s offered post-award debriefing, before the protestor 
may file a bid protest at GAO.  In American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE), the protestor (a Government employee union organization) protested the award 
of a contract resulting from an A-76 acquisition.  [Ref. 7]  GAO stated that the 
Government’s MP was not an offer, and that no contract would result from an A-76 
decision to retain the work in-house; therefore neither the Government employees in the 
Most Efficient Organization (MEO) nor their union were “interested parties” under law.  
Only interested parties may protest at GAO, thus AFGE was not permitted to file a 
protest.  GAO therefore dismissed the protest on this issue.   
The common theme in these cases is GAO’s insistence that the protestor take 
action in accordance with the deadlines set forth in the FAR and in case law.  For 
example, any objection to solicitation provisions, or to the issuance of the solicitation 
itself, must be filed at GAO before the closing deadline for receipt of offers.  The other 
common thread is that GAO applies the same strict timeliness standards to A-76 
acquisitions and to issues contained within those A-76 procurements as they do to 
traditional non-A-76 acquisitions.    
 
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an analysis of the data that was presented in Chapter III.  
The researcher first analyzed the General Accounting Office (GAO) bid protest case data 
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(i.e. that data arrayed on an overall case-by-case basis.)  The researcher then analyzed the 
issue data within each of the five issue categories (i.e. that data arrayed using the topical 
issue categories previously identified.)  Within each issue category, common themes, 
trends, and problems were identified and discussed.   
The next chapter will provide short- and long-term recommendations, answers to 














































V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A.  OVERVIEW 
This chapter will present the researcher’s conclusions drawn from the 
investigation and analysis of the General Accounting Office (GAO) bid protest decisions 
on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) A-76 competitive sourcing acquisitions.    
Recommendations derived from these conclusions will be provided.  The researcher will 
provide answers to the research questions posed in the first chapter of the thesis, followed 
by suggestions for areas of further research.   
 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
A-76 studies are seen as an effective method to expose the federal workforce to 
the forces of market competition.  An activity undergoing study must streamline its 
processes, reorganize its workforce along newer, more efficient lines, and thereby save 
operational dollars without sacrificing the quality of services.  A-76 studies will continue 
to be conducted on a large scale.  President Bush has set a goal for federal agencies to 
complete A-76 studies on approximately 425,000 Government positions by the end of 
fiscal year 2004.  Therefore, it is important to examine A-76 protests and protest losses, 
in order to avoid future protests, or successfully defend against protests that are filed.   
A significant number of A-76 procurements are protested.  For example, between 
1995 and 2000, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted 286 studies.  [Ref. 54 p. 4]  
During that same period, this thesis identified 21 protests lodged.  Thus, over seven 
percent of those A-76 acquisitions were protested.   
During the period covered by the thesis (February 1996 through December 2002), 
the overall Government “win rate” (i.e. the Government procuring agency successfully 
won or defended the protest) at GAO for all bid protest actions was approximately 80 
percent.  [Ref. 72]  During the same period, the Government win rate for all A-76 bid 
protests examined in this thesis was only 59 percent.  The Government loses a 
significantly higher percentage of A-76 bid protests (41%) compared to its loss rate on all 
protests overall (20%.)   
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The GAO case data were examined to determine what effect (if any) a variety of 
case parameters had on the outcome of the A-76 protest actions.  The parameters used to 
analyze the case data included: study type (full study, direct conversion, etc.); protest 
type (award protest or pre-award protest); private sector source selection strategy (best 
value trade-off, low price technically acceptable (LPTA), sealed bid, or sole source); 
agency under study; and, year of protest action.   
The study type had no observable effect on the Government win rate at GAO. 
Under protest type, the Government had a better win rate (67%) on pre-award protests 
compared to the win rate for A-76 protests overall (59%.)  This higher win rate for pre-
award protests was attributable to a lower incidence of problematic A-76 issues, and a 
higher incidence of easily defended challenges to the Government’s determination of its 
minimum needs.  Under the various private sector source selection strategies, the 
Government had a better win rate (80%) on LPTA source selection protests compared to 
the win rate for A-76 protests overall (59%.)  This higher win rate for LPTA source 
selection protests was attributable to a lower incidence of problematic A-76 issues, and 
particularly due to the absence of any A-76 Process – Balancing Issues.  Within the case 
data categories of protests by procuring agency and protests by year, the data suggested 
that the Government win rates were driven by the varying percentages of the more 
problematic A-76 protest issues, and not by the identity of the procuring agency that 
conducted the acquisition nor by the year of the protest.  Overall, the types of issues 
within the cases, and the difficulty in defending those various issues, drove the 
Government’s A-76 bid protest win rate.   
The researcher then examined the Government win rate in each of five “issue 
categories”, which were established by the researcher based on an initial examination of 
the protests.  The issue categories were: A-76 Process Issues; A-76 Process – Balancing 
Issues; Performance Work Statement (PWS) Issues; Contracting Issues; and, Legal/GAO 
Procedural Issues.  The first two categories cover issues unique to A-76 procurements.  
The latter three categories cover traditional issues (i.e. issues not directly related to A-76 
acquisitions.)   
The two issue categories unique to A-76 acquisitions, “A-76 Process Issues” and 
A-76 Process – Balancing Issues”, had relatively low Government win rates (58 percent 
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and 20 percent respectively.)  The remaining three issue categories, those not directly 
related to A-76 acquisitions, “PWS Issues”, “Contracting Issues”, and “Legal/GAO 
Procedural Issues”, had relatively high Government win rates (100 percent, 72 percent, 
and 100 percent respectively.)  Procuring agencies have had difficulty defending their 
actions in issues unique to A-76 procurements.   
The researcher then analyzed each issue category via an examination of 
representative protests in each category.  The A-76 Process Issues were further 
subdivided into four topical groupings: issues related to Government Management (MP) 
compliance with the performance work statement (PWS) and proper costing of the MP; 
application of A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook (RSH) cost adjustment factors; 
applicability of A-76 rules, procedures and processes; and, ethics/conflict of interest 
considerations.   
There were several themes common to a number of protest issues related to the 
Government MP.  Most of the instances of alleged or actual MP non-compliance 
revolved around sufficiency of staffing, particularly problems with both key personnel 
requirements and with non-Most Efficient Organization (MEO) support.  Key personnel 
requirements created problems with MP compliance regarding the number of hours 
proposed, and also created problems regarding the ability of proposed MP key personnel 
to meet PWS minimum standards for education and experience.  In several cases, the 
Government MP failed to account for supporting in-house staff within the MEO, or failed 
to include the costs of that non-MEO support in the Government In-House Cost Estimate 
(IHCE.)  Another theme that emerged was GAO’s focus on consistent treatment of the 
Government MP and the private sector challenger.  Both the Government MP and the 
private sector challenger must be held to the same PWS standards.  Regardless of 
whether the issue was related to staffing, government-furnished facilities, or other 
technical and cost issues, GAO required that both parties in the A-76 competition be 
treated consistently to insure a fair Government versus contractor cost comparison.  This 
emphasis on fairness in the cost comparison phase (Government versus contractor) 
echoed GAO’s historical approach when evaluating competing private offers under non-
A-76 procurements.  GAO also made clear that under a performance based PWS, the 
Government MP may be acceptable, even if it provides a very different staffing and 
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technical approach from that of the private sector challenger.  This was consistent with 
GAO’s position that acceptable staffing levels and technical approaches may vary among 
private sector offerors as well.  Similar to traditional non-A-76 procurement, GAO’s 
decisions emphasized the need for the procuring agency to follow the evaluation scheme 
set forth in the solicitation, and to appropriately and thoroughly document its actions in 
the contract file.  As part of that documentation, the GAO decisions clearly indicated that 
the procuring agency’s source selection authority (SSA) is fully responsible for insuring 
that the Government MP can meet PWS requirements, even though the A-76 RSH 
charges the requiring activity’s “Independent Review Officer (IRO)” with performing 
this function.   
In A-76 RSH cost adjustment issues, GAO again considered whether or not the 
procuring agency treated the Government MP and the private sector challenger 
consistently and fairly.  The other major theme was GAO’s examination of whether or 
not the procuring agency followed required processes in calculating and applying the 
various A-76 RSH cost adjustment factors, and whether or not any required subjective 
judgments were reasonably based and coherently recorded in the contract file.   
Two types of protest issues were included in the A-76 rules, procedures and 
processes topical grouping.  The first related to the overall applicability of the A-76 
policy to specific Government acquisitions.  GAO generally allowed the executive 
agencies to determine applicability.  The second set of issues related to the proper 
application of various A-76 rules, practices, and policies, within acquisitions that were 
processed under A-76 procedures.  GAO examined the cases to insure that procedures set 
forth in the RSH were properly followed.  GAO also allowed the procuring agency some 
room for flexibility and took a common-sense approach in several cases.  GAO carefully 
considered whether the procuring agency’s actions created an unfair competition, or 
caused an inconsistency in the treatment of the private sector challenger compared to the 
Government MP.   
There are several common themes that ran through the protests in the 
ethics/conflict of interest topical grouping.  Both Government employees conducting A-
76 studies, as well as the support contractors who assist them, were bound by Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) conflict of interest rules.  GAO first looked to see if a 
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conflict or an appearance of conflict was present.  If so, GAO then went on to consider 
whether or not the protestor was impacted or harmed as a result.  GAO clearly established 
that employees whose jobs were undergoing A-76 study could not participate in the 
evaluation of private sector proposals.  However, GAO found no conflict where the 
Government employee technical evaluators were in the department being studied, but 
were not in direct danger of losing their jobs.  GAO also established that the same 
individual/s could not serve on both the PWS team and the Government MP team.   
In a number of the A-76 Process – Balancing Issue cases, the procuring agency 
failed to follow the required A-76 RSH balancing process, either completely failing to 
consider the need for balancing, or failing to consider the potential impact of private 
sector challenger enhancements in performing the balancing step.  In some cases, the 
agency did not properly document and support the analysis and rationale utilized in the 
balancing phase.  The Integrity Management and Sodexho protests provided a sharp 
counterpoint.  In each of those acquisitions, the procuring agency fully considered the 
need for technical balancing.  The agency’s written analysis thoroughly documented its 
leveling review and the rationale for the conclusions reached.  In Integrity Management, 
the SSA specifically advised the (eventual) protestor during discussions that he found no 
evidence of increases in performance or performance quality beyond that required by the 
PWS, giving the firm the opportunity to rebut the SSA’s position, and/or improve the 
firm’s technical proposal.  [Ref. 23 p. 5]    
The PWS Issue cases all reflected GAO’s historical willingness to allow an 
agency to determine its own minimum needs.  The procuring agency must act reasonably 
in allocating risk and disclose all pertinent information in its solicitation.   
In the Contracting Issue cases, GAO reiterated some of its common standards 
used to assess the propriety of the procuring agency’s actions.  GAO examined each case 
to determine if the agency evaluated proposals in the manner that was communicated to 
industry in the solicitation, and if the protestor was treated fairly and consistently in the 
evaluation process.  Another common theme in these cases was the high incidence of 
protests over the evaluation of private sector staffing proposals.  GAO established that the 
procuring agency had the right to evaluate proposed staffing against an undisclosed 
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Government staffing estimate, provided that the solicitation cited staffing as an 
evaluation factor.  GAO also considered whether or not the agency properly considered 
any differences or unique features in a firm’s staffing and approach, in assessing whether 
the amount of staffing proposed was sufficient to perform the PWS requirements.   
The common theme in the Legal/GAO Procedural Issue cases was GAO’s 
insistence that the protestor take action in accordance with the deadlines set forth in the 
FAR and in case law.  For example, any objection to solicitation provisions, or to the 
issuance of the solicitation itself, must be filed at GAO before the closing deadline for 
receipt of offers.  The other common thread was that GAO applied the same strict 
timeliness standards to A-76 acquisitions, and to issues contained within those A-76 
procurements, as they did to traditional non-A-76 acquisitions.   
 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Improve Communications Between Acquisition Personnel, Requiring 
Activity Personnel, and Industry 
The procuring agency contracting officer must take the lead in coordinating the 
interests of the various stakeholders in an A-76 competition.  It is essential that the 
contracting officer communicate critical information up front to the requiring activity (i.e. 
the Government activity being studied.)  The requiring activity is usually the source for 
Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) members, PWS Team members, and 
Government MP Team members.  The contracting officer must explain the prohibition 
against dual membership on both the MP and PWS teams, the prohibition against dual 
membership on both the MP and SSEB teams, and the limited role that may be played by 
employees whose positions are part of the A-76 study.  The contracting officer should 
encourage questions regarding any specific issues relative to team membership, and seek 
the advice of legal counsel as needed.  This will avoid conflicts of interest as the A-76 
acquisition proceeds, and also allows maximum time for the requiring activity to 
assemble personnel with the necessary knowledge for each team.   
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The contracting officer must also take the lead in improving communications with 
industry and with the Government MP team.  Conducting pre-solicitation conferences 
with industry and the Government MP team to explain the A-76 requirement may help to 
identify inconsistencies, ambiguities, or other problems in the PWS or the associated 
historical workload.  The draft PWS should be publicly posted to the Internet for industry 
and MP team comments and questions.  This technique is often more effective than the 
pre-solicitation conference, as firms may be more likely to submit critiques and 
suggestions privately to the contracting officer.  In addition to improving the final 
solicitation, early publication of the draft PWS reduces the chance that the Government 
MP team will gain advance information that is not yet available to the potential private 
sector offerors.   
Throughout the A-76 acquisition process, the contracting officer must maintain an 
open dialogue with industry and Government stakeholders.  Questions from industry or 
the MP team regarding the issued solicitation must be thoroughly investigated, answered 
as appropriate, and communicated equally to potential private sector offerors and to the 
Government MP team.  Full disclosure of pertinent data to all parties on an equal basis 
will preclude situations of alleged unfair or unequal treatment.     
2.  Focus on Specific Areas in Performance Work Statement (PWS) 
Preparation and Review 
A-76 professionals have long recognized the need to carefully prepare 
performance work statements that are clear and unambiguous, and that fully describe the 
types and quantities of tasks that must be performed.  The PWS team and the contracting 
officer must also pay special attention to those specific PWS issues that have created 
problems and protests in the past.  The PWS team must insure that the PWS identifies all 
equipment, supplies, and facilities that will be provided as Government-furnished.  The 
contracting officer must insure that the Government MP team does not utilize, at no cost, 
any Government-furnished property not identified as such in the PWS.  Any and all 
pertinent and reasonably available historical workload information must be disclosed in 
the solicitation.  The contracting officer must be careful to insure that any pertinent 
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information already available to the MP team is also included in the PWS for the benefit 
of industry.      
The use of a performance based PWS is mandatory in A-76 procurements.  [Ref. 
60]  Use of key personnel provisions that require specific service employees/employee 
categories, or required numbers of hours, are discouraged under performance based 
service contracting (PBSC.)  However, requiring activities sometimes mandate a limited 
amount of required positions or minimum hours for security, safety, or mission-related 
reasons.  If (for example) a Program Manager is required, the PWS team must limit any 
minimum education and experience requirements.  The contracting officer must remind 
the PWS team that the Government MP team must also meet these qualifications, and 
that the potential for personnel actions during MEO implementation makes it difficult for 
the MP team to identify a key individual up front.  Thus, the MP team will not be able to 
pre-select a candidate to meet PWS qualifications.  For this same reason, even if the PWS 
includes key personnel experience requirements for performance of the services, the 
solicitation must never request resumes as part of the technical proposal submission 
requirements.  If the PWS will require any specified personnel, the contracting officer 
must also insure that terms such as “dedicated”, “full time”, and “on-site” are clearly 
defined, to avoid inconsistent interpretations among private offerors and the MP team.   
3.  Improve the Private Sector Evaluation and Source Selection Process 
The contracting officer should consider limiting the amount and type of technical 
proposal information requested from industry.  The more elaborate and lengthy the 
private sector technical proposals, the better the chances of the technical evaluators 
missing an enhancement that may require balancing of the Government MP.  Even if the 
private sector challenger’s increases in performance or performance quality are 
recognized, the procuring agencies have had significant difficulties in properly 
conducting the balancing process.  However, limiting the size of the private sector 
technical proposals, or the elimination of factors such as “technical approach” (under 
which the offeror specifically describes how it will perform PWS tasks), may reduce the 
chances of generating innovative ideas from industry.  The requiring activity and the 
contracting officer must jointly determine the extent and type of private sector technical 
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proposal information required, depending on the particular circumstances of the A-76 
acquisition.      
The contracting officer should inform private sector offerors in the solicitation 
evaluation section that their proposals will be examined for increases in performance or 
performance quality beyond the requirements of the PWS.  The solicitation should 
require offerors to specifically point out areas in their proposal where the firm believes it 
has proposed such enhancements.  The SSEB’s technical evaluation of private sector 
offerors should identify any areas of enhanced performance or quality, or specifically 
state that no such increases were noted.  If competitive discussions are conducted in 
negotiated procurements, the contracting officer should inform firms whether or not the 
procuring agency has identified any performance or quality enhancements.  These actions 
will help the contracting officer in determining the need for balancing, and conducting 
the balancing process if required.  They will also help the contracting officer in the event 
that a firm later takes issue with the Government’s evaluation of the offeror’s proposal.   
As in any solicitation, the contracting officer must take great care in A-76 
procurements to insure that the solicitation evaluation criteria are followed, the rating and 
ranking of private sector proposals and the resultant source selection is thoroughly 
documented, and the private sector offerors are treated consistently and fairly.  The 
contracting officer must take special care in the evaluation of private sector staffing 
proposals.  The unique approach or particular staffing mix of each offeror must be 
considered, when comparing the firm’s staffing proposal to the Government’s estimate of 
required staffing, in order to determine acceptability and assign an appropriate rating.   
4.  Improve the Government Management Plan (MP), Technical 
Balancing, and Cost Comparison Processes 
The contracting officer must insure that the Government MP is prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of the A-76 RSH.  Although the contracting officer 
cannot review the Government MP until late in the overall A-76 process, she must query 
the MP team up front regarding the possible use of any non-appropriated fund (NAFI) or 
volunteer personnel in the MEO.  Volunteer or other no-cost labor is prohibited, and any 
significant use of NAFI personnel must be disclosed to industry in the solicitation, to 
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insure a fair competition.  The contracting officer/SSA is fully responsible for insuring 
that the MP technical submission meets all solicitation requirements, and must also insure 
that the Government IHCE is properly prepared in accordance with A-76 RSH 
guidelines.  The contracting officer, SSA, and administrative appeal authority may utilize 
the SSEB or other in-house support to assist in making technical compliance 
determinations.  The contracting officer has the right and the obligation to require 
correction of mistakes and request clarifications in the Government MP, regardless of 
when they are discovered.   
The contracting officer/SSA must thoroughly examine the private sector 
challenger’s technical proposal to determine if it contains any increases to performance or 
quality beyond the level required by the PWS.  If any such enhancements are present, the 
contracting officer/SSA must carefully perform technical balancing, and insure that the 
Government MP makes appropriate changes in its technical and price submissions.  The 
contracting officer/SSA should utilize the SSEB as necessary to assist in the balancing 
process.  The contracting officer/SSA must recognize that the private sector challenger 
and the Government MP may have very different staffing levels or technical approaches, 
yet be equivalent in levels of performance and quality.   
In conducting the cost comparison between the private sector challenger and the 
Government MP, the contracting officer must be well versed in the calculation and 
application of all A-76 RSH cost adjustment factors.  The contracting officer must insure 
consistent treatment of the Government MP and all private sector offerors throughout the 
conduct of the entire A-76 acquisition process. 
The contracting officer must conduct all of these unique A-76 portions of the 
acquisition process with the same care and thoroughness that was utilized in the selection 
of the private sector challenger.  It is absolutely essential that each of these actions be 
carefully and thoroughly documented in the contract file.  Detailed documentation can 
assist the contracting officer in debriefing unsuccessful firms and avoiding protests, and 




5. Provide Training and Lessons Learned 
On individual A-76 acquisitions, the contracting officer must provide up front 
training to requiring activity personnel.  The activity undergoing the A-76 study must be 
thoroughly familiar with the rules and problem areas related to Government MP 
preparation, proper costing of the IHCE, and conflict of interest prohibitions.  Requiring 
activity personnel must have a general understanding of the A-76 procurement process, 
and how their participation fits into that process.  Providing this working knowledge at 
the start of the A-76 acquisition will help avoid later problems.  The contracting officer 
must remain available to answer questions from the PWS team, Government MP team, 
SSEB, and other stakeholders throughout the A-76 process.    
Formal A-76 training must also be provided to requiring activity and procuring 
agency personnel.  Prospective requiring activity team members must be intimately 
familiar with the duties of their team, and the rules and processes that must be followed.  
Contracting personnel need to gain an understanding of the entire A-76 process, not just 
the “contracting” portions.  This will become increasingly important, as the contracting 
officer will likely have increased responsibilities for review of the PWS and Government 
MP in the future, once the new revised A-76 circular is issued.   
A-76 personnel, and particularly contracting personnel, must continue to share 
lessons learned and best practices regarding the complex issues of private sector source 
selection, technical performance balancing, and the various steps in calculating and 
finalizing the Government MP versus private sector challenger cost comparison.  
Contracting and legal personnel must closely follow any changes in policy or regulations, 








D.  ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.  Primary Research Question 
The primary research question was: “What common issues and trends are 
contained in GAO A-76 bid protests, and what acquisition planning and process actions 
may be taken to alleviate future problems?”   
The primary research question is answered by means of the responses provided to 
the following subsidiary research questions.   
2.  Subsidiary Research Question Number One 
Subsidiary Research Question Number One was: “How numerous are the GAO 
protests lodged against A-76 studies?” 
During the period covered by the thesis (5 February 1996 through 23 December 
2002), 46 A-76 bid protests were filed at GAO. Overall, a significant percentage of A-76 
procurements are protested.  For example, between 1995 and 2000, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) conducted 286 A-76 studies.  [Ref. 54 p. 4]  During that same period, this 
thesis identified 21 protests lodged.  Thus, over seven percent of those A-76 acquisitions 
were protested.   
3.   Subsidiary Research Question Number Two 
Subsidiary Research Question Number Two was: “What are the underlying causes 
of these protests, and what factors affect the success or failure of the protests?”   
The issues that were contested in the A-76 protests were identified and 
categorized into the following issue categories: A-76 Process Issues; A-76 Process – 
Balancing Issues; Performance Work Statement (PWS) Issues; Contracting Issues; and, 
Legal/GAO Procedural Issues.  The first two categories cover issues unique to A-76 
procurements.  The latter three categories cover traditional issues (i.e. issues not directly 
related to A-76 acquisitions.)  The two issue categories unique to A-76 acquisitions, “A-
76 Process Issues” and “A-76 Process – Balancing Issues”, had relatively low 
Government win rates (58 percent and 20 percent respectively.)  The remaining three 
issue categories, those not directly related to A-76 acquisitions, “PWS Issues”, 
“Contracting Issues”, and “Legal/GAO Procedural Issues”, had relatively high 
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Government win rates (100 percent, 72 percent, and 100 percent respectively.)  Procuring 
agencies have had difficulty defending their actions in issues unique to A-76 
procurements.   
The GAO case data were examined to determine what effect (if any) a variety of 
case parameters had on the outcome of the A-76 protest actions.  The parameters used to 
analyze the case data included: study type (full study, direct conversion, etc.); protest 
type (award protest or pre-award protest); private sector source selection strategy (best 
value trade-off, low price technically acceptable (LPTA), sealed bid, or sole source); 
agency under study; and, year of protest action.  Within the case data categories, the data 
suggested that the Government win rates at GAO were driven by the presence and 
varying percentages of the more problematic A-76 protest issues, and not because of the 
case data parameters.  Overall, the types of issues within the cases, and the difficulty in 
defending those various issues, drove the Government’s A-76 bid protest win rate.   
4.  Subsidiary Research Question Number Three 
Subsidiary Research Question Number Three was: “What are the common issues, 
themes, or trends associated with these protests?” 
The thesis identified a number of common themes, issues, and trends.  There were 
a number of protest issues related to the Government MP compliance with the PWS.  
Another theme that emerged was GAO’s focus on consistent treatment of the 
Government MP and the private sector challenger.  This emphasis on fairness in the cost 
comparison phase (Government versus contractor) echoed GAO’s historical approach 
when evaluating competing private offers under non-A-76 procurements.  Similar to 
traditional non-A-76 procurement, GAO’s decisions emphasized the need for the 
procuring agency to follow the evaluation scheme set forth in the solicitation, and to 
appropriately and thoroughly document its actions in the contract file.  GAO examined 
the cases to insure that procedures set forth in the RSH were properly followed.   
GAO clearly established that employees whose jobs were undergoing A-76 study 
could not participate in the evaluation of private sector proposals.  However, GAO found 
no conflict where the Government employee technical evaluators were in the department 
being studied, but were not in direct danger of losing their jobs.  GAO also established 
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that the same individual/s could not serve on both the PWS team and the Government MP 
team.   
In a number of the A-76 Process – Balancing Issue cases, the procuring agency 
failed to follow the required A-76 RSH balancing process, either completely failing to 
consider the need for balancing, or failing to consider the potential impact of private 
sector challenger enhancements in performing the balancing step.   
5.  Subsidiary Research Question Number Four 
Subsidiary Research Question Number Four was: “What acquisition planning and 
process actions may be taken to alleviate future problems, particularly in light of the new 
OMB procedures?”   
The researcher provided five recommendations for A-76 process improvement: 
(1) Improve Communications Between Acquisition Personnel, Requiring Activity 
Personnel, and Industry; (2) Focus on Specific Areas in Performance Work Statement 
(PWS) Preparation and Review; (3) Improve the Private sector Evaluation and Source 
Selection Process; (4) Improve the Government Management Plan (MP), Technical 
Balancing, and Cost Comparison Processes; and, (5) Provide Training and Lessons 
Learned.           
E.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A study of future A-76 GAO bid protests should be conducted, covering protest 
decisions issued on or after 24 December 2002 (i.e. after the time period analyzed in this 
thesis.)  A review of GAO A-76 bid protest decisions rendered on acquisitions conducted 
under the new A-76 circular (soon to be implemented) would be particularly useful, to 
detect any changing trends or new issues resulting from the new A-76 process. 
 
F.  SUMMARY 
This thesis examined GAO A-76 bid protest decisions issued between 5 February 
1996 and 23 December 2002.  The cases and protest issues were analyzed, to ascertain 
the reasons that A-76 protests were lodged, and the reasons that the Government 
procuring agency lost A-76 protests.  The researcher identified common themes, trends, 
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and key issues, and drew conclusions based on that information.  Recommendations for 
A-76 process improvements were developed and provided.   
 It is the researcher’s hope that the information contained in this thesis will 
be of benefit to A-76 personnel, particularly to Government acquisition personnel 
















































APPENDIX A.  SYNOPSIS OF GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE A-76 
BID PROTESTS 
(5 February 1996 to 23 December 2002) 
 
This appendix contains a brief synopsis of each GAO bid protest analyzed by the 
researcher.  The appendix provides a short description of the issue/s contained in each 
protest, identifies the applicable issue categories, and provides GAO’s rulings on each 
issue and on each bid protest.  The researcher developed the five issue categories and the 
subsequent categorization of the issues.   
 
1. Aberdeen Technical Services, B-283727.2, February 22, 2000 
Protest that Government In-House Cost Estimate (IHCE) did not include full costs 
of program manager and other key personnel – sustained.  General Accounting Office 
(GAO) agreed with protestor.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that procuring agency failed to consider potential balancing of 
Government Management Plan (MP) with private sector challenger firm – sustained.  
GAO found that procuring agency failed to consider levels of performance and 
performance quality of MP and private sector challenger firm.  (A-76 Process – 
Balancing issue) 
Protest that procuring agency disallowed protestor’s final proposal revision (FPR) 
price reduction – sustained.  GAO stated that procuring agency was not permitted to 
adjust protestor’s fixed price proposal, as all risk of performance under a fixed price 
contract rests with the contractor.  (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.)   
2. AHNTECH Inc., B-291044, October 10, 2002 
Protest that procuring agency improperly eliminated protestor from competitive 
range due to insufficient staffing – denied.  GAO found that agency had the right to 
evaluate staffing against an undisclosed staffing estimate.  (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
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3. American Federation of Government Employees, B-282904.2, June 7, 2000 
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) protested the award of a 
contract to a contractor based on the conduct of an A-76 study – dismissed.  GAO stated 
that the Government’s MP was not an offer, and no contract would result from an A-76 
decision to retain the work in-house; therefore neither the Government employees in the 
Most Efficient Organization (MEO) nor their union were “interested parties” under law.  
Only interested parties may protest at GAO, therefore AFGE was not permitted to file a 
protest.  (Legal/GAO Procedural issue)   
Overall outcome – protest dismissed (Government win.) 
4. ANV Enterprises, Inc., B-270013, February 5, 1996 
Protest that performance work statement (PWS) is ambiguous due to lack of 
detail, and risky due to failure of solicitation to offer equipment as Government-furnished 
– denied.  GAO found that procuring agency disclosed all available information, and was 
not required to offer Government-furnished equipment merely to reduce potential 
contractor risk.  (PWS issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
5. BAE Systems, B-287189, B-287189.2, May 14, 2001 
Protest that procuring agency did not determine that Government MP met the 
PWS requirements – sustained.  GAO stated that the acquisition record did not establish 
that the MP met the PWS in areas of key personnel and sufficiency of staffing.  (A-76 
Process issue) 
Protest that Government administrative appeal authority’s upward adjustments to 
MEO staffing were improper – sustained.  GAO found that although the administrative 
appeal authority (in reviewing the procuring agency’s actions) did conduct technical 
balancing, it did not document the basis for the amount of staffing that was added.   (A-
76 Process – Balancing issue) 
Protest that procuring agency failed to consider protestor’s increases to 
performance standards of PWS – sustained.  GAO stated that the procuring agency failed 
to consider whether the protestor’s offer to improve timeliness of service to walk-in 
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customers (within 15 minutes, vice 30 minute PWS requirement) was an improvement to 
performance.  The procuring agency therefore failed to determine whether or not 
balancing was required in this instance.  (A-76 Process – Balancing issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
6. BMAR & Associates, Inc., B-281664, March 18, 1999 
Protest that Government MP must include a Technical Performance Plan (TPP) 
under a two-step sealed bid A-76 procurement – denied.  GAO found that a TPP is only 
required in a negotiated A-76 acquisition, in accordance with provisions of the Revised 
Supplemental Handbook (RSH.)  (The MP in a sealed bid procurement must include the 
MEO and IHCE however.)  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that a fixed price arrangement for civil engineering work is too risky – 
sustained.  GAO stated that the fixed monthly price approach required by the solicitation 
was unreasonably risky and restricted competition, as there was no limit on, and no way 
to reasonably estimate, the amount of routine and emergency service calls that would 
occur.   (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
7. COBRO Corp., B-287578.2, October 15, 2001 
Protest that procuring agency treated the Government MP and private offerors 
differently with respect to government-furnished facilities – sustained.  GAO found that 
private offerors had to propose their own facilities (affecting their technical approach and 
cost), while the Government MP utilized existing Government facilities at no additional 
cost.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that negotiated solicitation encouraged offerors to propose enhancements 
to the PWS, but those enhancements were not considered for potential balancing of 
private offeror with the Government MP – no decision.  GAO stated it would not rule on 
this issue because protest was sustained on the merits of the first issue.  However, GAO 
went on to state that the agency in fact did not consider the private offeror’s 
enhancements in comparing the private offer versus MP performance quality for possible 
balancing.  This decision is considered a Government protest loss, as it is clear that the 
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procuring agency’s failure to consider balancing is a fatal flaw in the conduct of an A-76 
acquisition (see BAE Systems above.)  (A-76 Process – Balancing issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
8. Consolidated Engineering Services, Inc., B-291345, B-291345.2,  
December 23, 2002 
Protest against elimination of protestor’s proposal due to poor past performance 
rating – sustained.  GAO found that the procuring agency assigned a rating of “little 
confidence” to the protestor’s past performance.  However, the agency later admitted that 
the “little confidence” rating amounted to an acceptable rating in the evaluation scheme 
used, and had no coherent explanation as to why the protestor’s proposal was eliminated 
on that basis.   (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
9. Crown Healthcare Laundry Services, Inc., B-270827, B-270827.2,  
April 30, 1996 
Protest that procuring agency improperly evaluated the inter-service support 
agreement (ISSA) offer from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) – denied.  (The 
A-76 RSH process also allows other government agencies to offer to perform the work.)  
GAO stated that the PWS was performance based, such that each offeror could decide 
how to staff the work and how many laundry trucks it would use, and cost its offer 
accordingly.  Thus, GAO found that the procuring agency reasonably accepted the VA 
estimates.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that procuring agency should have added the Government’s cost of 
contract administration to the VA’s ISSA cost – denied.  GAO stated that the VA would 
do its own quality assurance, so the agency was proper in not adding the additional 
contract administration cost to the ISSA.  (A-76 Process issue)  
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
10. Crown Support Services, Inc., B-287070, January 31, 2001 
Protest of earlier denial of protestor’s appeal to administrative appeal authority, 
contesting the outcome of the A-76 cost comparison – dismissed.  GAO stated that the 
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protest was untimely, in that it was filed more than ten days after the initial appeal was 
denied.  (Legal/GAO Procedural issue)   
Overall outcome – protest dismissed (Government win.) 
11. Day Zimmermann Hawthorne Corp., B-287121, March 30, 2001 
Protest that solicitation requirement for private offeror to include insurance costs 
is unfair, given that Government MP does not have to include such costs – denied.  GAO 
found that the Government is self-insured (thus no premium costs), and the A-76 RSH 
takes this into account by requiring that the MP include a cost addition factor to account 
for this discrepancy.   (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that prospective contractor should be granted special indemnity protection 
due to hazardous nature of the work (ordnance handling) – denied.  GAO stated that it is 
within the procuring agency’s discretion to determine whether the risk warrants such 
protection.  (PWS issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
12. Del-Jen, Inc., B-287273.2, January 23, 2002 
Protest that Government MP understated its cost of administering an “embedded” 
subcontract (i.e. the Government MEO’s use of a private subcontractor to supplement its 
proposed in-house Government workforce) – sustained.  GAO found that the MP did not 
include this cost within its overall personnel costs, as required by the A-76 RSH.  (A-76 
Process issue) 
Protest that procuring agency added too much money to protestor’s price in 
calculating the price adjustment for contract administration – sustained.  GAO found that 
the MP improperly calculated the number of full time equivalent (FTE) personnel needed 
to perform contract administration, thereby overstating the contract administration cost.  
(A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that procuring agency made an improper upward adjustment to grade 
structure (and thus cost) of contract administration personnel during an administrative 
appeal – sustained.  GAO stated that the mix of (relatively) highly graded personnel was 
inconsistent with Department of Defense (DoD) guidance.   (A-76 Process issue) 
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Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
13. Department of the Navy – Reconsideration  [Jones-Hill], B-286194.7,  
May 29, 2002 
The Navy asked GAO to reconsider its earlier determination that the presence of 
the same Government employees and support contractor personnel on both the PWS team 
and the Government MP team constituted a conflict of interest – affirmed, but modified.  
GAO affirmed its earlier decision that a conflict of interest was present.  However, GAO 
did modify its decision such that the revised conflict of interest standard would only be 
applied to A-76 procurements conducted after GAO’s initial conflict of interest ruling.  
(A-76 Process issue) 
 Overall outcome – protest decision affirmed (Government loss.) 
14. DynCorp Technical Services LLC, B-284833.3, B-284833.4, July 17, 2001 
Protest that agency improperly evaluated the cost of government furnished 
material – sustained.  GAO stated that the procuring agency allowed the Government 
IHCE to deduct the cost value of government furnished material, without making the 
required corresponding downward adjustment to the protestor’s cost.   (A-76 Process 
issue) 
Protest that procuring agency did not properly consider the protestor’s accelerated 
performance schedule – sustained.  GAO found that the procuring agency did not 
properly consider the impact of the acceleration as an increase in performance that might 
necessitate technical balancing.  GAO stated that a generic statement regarding balancing 
was insufficient file documentation.   (A-76 Process – Balancing issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
15. Federal Prison Industries, B-290546, July 15, 2002 
Protest that procuring agency improperly found that protestor’s product was not 
comparable to private sector product, resulting in an award to a private contractor – 
dismissed.  GAO cited its A-76 interpretation of “interested party” under AFGE, in 
determining that protestor was not eligible to file a GAO protest.  This protest is included 
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in the thesis because of GAO’s affirmation of its earlier ruling on what constitutes an 
interested party under A-76 acquisitions.   (Legal/GAO Procedural issue)   
Overall outcome – protest dismissed (Government win.) 
16. Gemini Industries, Inc., B-281323, January 25, 1999 
Protest that procuring agency improperly evaluated protestor’s staffing against an 
undisclosed staffing estimate – denied.  GAO stated that the procuring agency had the 
right to use an undisclosed staffing estimate for evaluation, given that solicitation notified 
offerors that staffing would be evaluated, and given that the procuring agency did 
consider any unique features in protestor’s proposal.   (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
17. E.L. Hamm & Associates, Inc., B-290783, B-290783.2, September 30, 2002 
Protest that procuring agency improperly evaluated protestor’s proposal as 
unacceptable – denied.  GAO found that procuring agency conducted a proper evaluation 
and appropriately documented the results.  (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
18. Imaging Systems Technology, B-283817.3, December 19, 2000 
Protest that procuring agency failed to utilize A-76 procedures, where the agency 
cancelled a non-A-76 solicitation after determining that in-house personnel could perform 
the work at less cost– denied.  GAO stated that non-use of A-76 may have violated 
agency policy, but given that the solicitation was not issued under A-76 procedures, there 
was no valid basis for this aspect of the protest.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that procuring agency did not consider all Government in-house costs in 
determining that in-house performance was more economical – sustained.  GAO found 
that the procuring agency did not consider the costs of in-house labor support provided 
from remote locations (locations physically separate from the primary location of 
services), and that therefore the agency’s conclusion was unreasonable.  (A-76 Process 
issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
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19. Integrity Management Enterprises, Inc., B-290193, B-290193.2,  
June 25, 2002 
Protest that procuring agency improperly amended the solicitation after the 
closing deadline for receipt of offers, based upon review of the technical portion of the 
Government MP – denied.  GAO stated that the agency had the right to alter the PWS to 
reflect its minimum needs, and that the changes were properly communicated to private 
sector offerors via amendment.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that government MP was not capable of performing the PWS and did not 
cover all necessary costs of performance – denied.  GAO found that the source selection 
authority (SSA) sought the assistance of the technical evaluation board to insure that 
Government MP was capable of performing.   (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that the protestor’s proposal provides a higher level of performance than 
the Government MP – denied.  GAO stated that the procuring agency thoroughly 
reviewed both technical submissions and properly concluded that no technical balancing 
was required.  (A-76 Process – Balancing issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
20. IT Corporation, B-288507, September 7, 2001 
Protest that procuring agency failed to address concerns regarding the inability of 
the Government MP to perform solicitation requirements – dismissed.  GAO stated that 
the protestor’s earlier appeal to the administrative appeal authority was found to have 
merit, and the procuring agency had committed to take corrective action.  However, 
because the procuring agency stated that it had not yet implemented corrective action, the 
protest was dismissed as premature.  Notwithstanding the dismissal, this decision is 
considered a Government protest loss, as GAO essentially endorsed the findings of the 
administrative appeal authority (i.e. that the procuring agency made errors in conducting 
the A-76 cost comparison.)  (A-76 Process issue)   
 Overall outcome – protest dismissed (Government loss.) 
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21. IT Corporation, B-289517.3, July 10, 2002 
(This is a different A-76 acquisition from the case identified immediately above.)   
Protest that procuring agency improperly cancelled solicitation – denied.  GAO 
stated that the agency discovered that the solicitation’s historical workload was 
inaccurate, and that the procuring agency has broad authority to determine its 
requirements.  Thus, the agency’s solicitation cancellation was reasonable.  (Contracting 
issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
22. IT Facility Services-Joint Venture, B-285841, October 17, 2000 
Protest that presence on source selection evaluation board (SSEB) of Government 
employees who were in the function under A-76 study created a conflict of interest – 
denied.  GAO found no conflict, because the positions of the employees in question were 
not included in the A-76 study (although the employees were located in the functional 
department being studied.)   (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that a conflict of interest existed where the spouse of one of the SSEB 
evaluators was in a position undergoing A-76 study – denied.  GAO stated that an 
appearance of conflict of interest did exist.  However, SSEB evaluation worksheets 
showed that if that evaluator’s rating were eliminated, protestor would still have been 
rated technically unacceptable.  Thus, the protestor was not harmed by the conflict of 
interest.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that the procuring agency’s use of the same support contractor to assist in 
both the preparation of the Government’s MP as well as the evaluation of private sector 
offers was improper – denied.  GAO found that the support contractor had implemented 
adequate “firewall” protection (i.e. the support contractor utilized different personnel for 
the two support tasks and did not allow information to pass from either group to the 
other.)  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest objecting to determination that protestor’s staffing was insufficient – 
denied.  GAO stated that procuring agency acted reasonably in assessing protestor’s 
staffing and approach to performing the PWS.  (Contracting issue) 
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Protest that procuring agency did not conduct adequate discussions regarding 
protestor’s insufficient staffing – denied.  GAO found that agency conducted meaningful 
discussions, and that procuring agency was not required to reopen discussions when 
protestor’s staffing remained insufficient after final proposal revisions.  (Contracting 
issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
23. J&E Associates, Inc., B-278187, January 5, 1998 
Protest that protestor’s technical proposal was misevaluated, resulting in selection 
of another firm as private sector challenger in the A-76 competition – denied.  GAO 
found that the procuring agency’s evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the 
evaluation factors disclosed in the solicitation.  (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
24. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., B-286714.2, February 13, 2001 
Protest that private sector firm selected for contact award had an unfair 
competitive advantage – sustained.  GAO stated that successful firm had a subcontractor 
who had inside information regarding the instant acquisition, based on that 
subcontractor’s work on a different Government contract for related work.  GAO found 
that the procuring agency took no action to mitigate the imbalance.  (Contracting issue)    
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
25. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., B-288636, B-288636.2,  
November 23, 2001 
(This is a different A-76 acquisition from the case identified immediately above.) 
Protest that Government MP failed to compare all the MEO positions with the 
current positions in the existing in-house workforce – denied.  GAO stated that there was 
no requirement to conduct a position-by-position comparison.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that Government IHCE did not cost out all the positions in the MEO – 
denied.  GAO found that the procuring agency properly concluded that the Government 
MP had identified and cost all MEO positions.   (A-76 Process issue) 
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Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.)   
26. Jones/Hill Joint Venture – Reconsideration, B-286194.2, December 8, 2000 
(This protest concerns the same A-76 acquisition referenced in case Number 13 
above and in case Number 27 immediately below.)   
Protest that procuring agency’s A-76 decision that it would be more economical 
to retain performance of services in-house is improper – dismissed.  GAO stated that 
procuring agency was in process of instituting corrective action in response to earlier 
protest, thus this instant protest was dismissed as academic.  However, this decision is 
considered a Government protest loss, as GAO confirmed that the procuring agency 
made errors in conducting the A-76 cost comparison, specifically in not considering the 
protestor’s technical enhancements as issues possibly requiring technical balancing.  (A-
76 Process – Balancing issue) 
Overall outcome – protest dismissed (Government loss.) 
27. Jones/Hill Joint Venture, B-286194.4, B-286194.5, B-286194.6,  
December 5, 2001 
Protest that the presence of the same Government employees and support 
contractor personnel on both the PWS team and the Government MP team constituted a 
conflict of interest – sustained.  GAO found that the Government MP team had an unfair 
competitive advantage due to the information available to those MP team members who 
also participated in the PWS team.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that the Government MP could not fully perform the PWS and did not 
include all costs necessary for performance – sustained.  GAO stated that the procuring 
agency did not document its determination that the MEO staffing could perform the PWS 
requirements.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that Government MP did not offer the same level of performance and 
performance quality as the protestor’s proposal – sustained.  GAO found that several 
enhancements identified in the evaluation of the protestor’s technical proposal were not 
considered during the balancing phase of the cost comparison.  (A-76 Process – 
Balancing issue) 
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Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
28. Lackland 21st Century Services Consolidated, B-285938.6, July 13, 2001 
Protest that procuring agency’s A-76 decision that it would be more economical 
to retain performance of services in-house is improper – dismissed.  GAO stated that 
procuring agency was in process of instituting corrective action in response to earlier 
protest, thus this instant protest was dismissed as academic.  However, this decision is 
considered a Government protest loss, as GAO confirmed that the procuring agency 
admitted that there were significant errors in the Government MP, sufficient to warrant 
corrective action, possibly leading to a reversal of the A-76 cost comparison decision.  
(A-76 Process issue) 
Overall outcome – protest dismissed (Government loss.) 
29. Lackland 21st Century Services Consolidated, B-285938.7, B-285938.8, 
December 4, 2001 
(This protest concerns the same A-76 acquisition referenced in case Number 28 
immediately above.)     
Protest that it was improper for procuring agency to utilize its in-house audit staff 
to review the cost comparison decision – denied.  GAO found nothing improper in the 
agency’s actions, especially considering that the acquisition had already been protested 
on an earlier occasion.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that procuring agency improperly canceled solicitation and reinitiated A-
76 solicitation process – denied.  GAO stated that the agency discovered problems with 
the solicitation, and that the procuring agency has broad discretion to cancel any 
solicitation. (Contracting issue)    
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
30. LBM Inc., B-286271, December 1, 2000 
Protest against requirement that private offerors must be certified to ISO-9000 
quality standards not later than the start date of contract services – denied.  GAO found 
 93
that the procuring agency acted reasonably in imposing the quality requirement, given 
that the PWS requires the service provider to move and refuel aircraft.  (PWS issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.)    
31. Madison Services, Inc., B-277614, November 3, 1997 
Protest that procuring agency violated the A-76 process by allowing Government 
MP team to change its IHCE after agency’s evaluation of protestor’s proposal – denied.  
GAO stated that the procuring agency properly allowed the correction of a mistake in the 
IHCE (i.e. the failure to initially include certain material and supply costs), and found no 
evidence that the agency improperly used any insights gained from review of protestor’s 
proposal.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
32. Morrison Knudsen Corp., B-281224, January 12, 1999 
Protest that a conflict of interest occurred where 14 out of 16 procuring agency 
evaluators charged with evaluating private sector offers held positions that were under 
study via the same A-76 acquisition – sustained.  GAO found an obvious conflict of 
interest that tainted the procuring agency’s determination that all private sector offers 
were unacceptable.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
33. N&N Travel & Tours, Inc., B-285164.2, B-285164.3, August 31, 2000 
Protest that issuance of a task order violated A-76 policy, in that a competitive 
solicitation under A-76 procedures should have been issued – denied.  GAO stated that it 
had no basis to question the procuring agency’s failure to utilize A-76 procedures, as no 
competitive solicitation was issued.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that procuring agency’s action violated Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) rules regarding small business set asides – sustained.  GAO found that procuring 
agency was required to set aside the requirement for small business, given that there was 
a reasonable expectation of receiving offers from at least two small businesses capable of 
performance.  (Contracting issue) 
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Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
34. NVT Technologies, Inc., B-289087, January 3, 2002 
Protest that Government IHCE did not utilize standard material “plug-in costs” 
(i.e. estimated costs stated in the solicitation that all private sector offerors were required 
to utilize) – denied.  GAO stated that the Government did include material costs, 
calculated based on the solicitation’s historical workload, that were in fact higher than the 
material plug-in amounts.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that Government MP did not cost out all safety, quality, and repair PWS 
requirements – denied.  GAO found that the protestor merely disagreed with the MEO 
staffing quantities and resulting IHCE costs calculated in the Government MP, and that 
the MP did consider all PWS functions.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that the contract administration adjustment costs added to the protestor’s 
price were too high, due to use of an excessive employee grade structure and mix – 
denied.  GAO stated that the protestor did not show that the procuring agency’s 
explanation of the grade structure utilized was unreasonable.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
35. Omni Corp., B-281082, December 22, 1998 
Protest that procuring agency conducted misleading discussions resulting in 
selection of a different firm as private sector challenger in an A-76 acquisition – 
dismissed.  GAO stated that the protestor must first attend the procuring agency’s offered 
post-award debriefing, before the protestor may file a bid protest at GAO.  (Legal/GAO 
Procedural issue)   
Overall outcome – protest dismissed (Government win.)   
36. Pacific Support Group, LLC, B-290467, August 8, 2002 
Protest against changes to Government MEO required by the administrative 
appeal authority – denied.  GAO found that the procuring agency acted properly, in that it 
was permissible for the administrative appeal authority to order changes to the MEO.  (A-
76 Process issue) 
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Protest that Government MEO staffing does not meet PWS requirements – 
denied.  GAO stated that there was no evidence that the Government MP approach for 
meeting PWS requirements was unreasonable.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
37. PharmChem Laboratories, Inc., B-280988, B-280988.2, December 17, 1998 
Protest that procuring agency improperly evaluated private sector technical 
proposals – denied.  GAO found that the procuring agency properly evaluated proposals 
in accordance with the solicitation criteria.  (Contracting issue) 
Protest against procuring agency’s use of non-cost factors to select private sector 
challenger in A-76 competition – denied.  GAO stated that the protest was untimely on 
this issue, as the protestor had a duty to object to the solicitation provisions prior to the 
closing deadline for receipt of offers.  (Legal/GAO Procedural issue) 
Protest that procuring agency violated A-76 rules in not determining existing 
contract price unreasonable before proceeding with A-76 acquisition – denied.  GAO 
stated that the protest was untimely on this issue, as the protestor had a duty to object to 
the issuance of the A-76 solicitation prior to the closing deadline for receipt of offers.  
(Legal/GAO Procedural issue) 
Protest that procuring agency did not utilize best value trade off criteria in 
conducting the Government MP versus private sector firm cost comparison – denied.  
GAO found that protestor was not an interested party on this issue, as it was not the 
successful private sector offeror, and therefore was not permitted to file a protest on this 
basis.  (Legal/GAO Procedural issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
38. Rice Services, Ltd., B-284997, June 29, 2000 
Protest that procuring agency failed to properly conduct technical balancing of the 
Government MP against the protestor’s technical proposal – sustained.  GAO stated that 
the procuring agency noted many technical enhancements during its evaluation of the 
protestor’s proposal.  However, when requested by the contracting officer to compare the 
levels of performance quality, the technical evaluation team stated that it found no 
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differences between the Government MP and the protestor’s proposal.  GAO found that 
the procuring agency’s generic explanation in this regard was insufficient, given that the 
procurement record had documented many specific excesses in the protestor’s offer.   (A-
76 Process – Balancing issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
39. Rice Services, Ltd., B-284997.5, March 12, 2002 
(This protest concerns the same A-76 acquisition referenced in case Number 38 
immediately above.) 
Protest that procuring agency unreasonably canceled an A-76 solicitation – 
denied.  GAO stated that the agency has broad discretion to determine its minimum 
needs, and reasonably canceled the solicitation when it discovered problems and 
inconsistencies in the document.  (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
40. RTS Travel Service, B-283055, September 23, 1999 
Protest that agency improperly determined that in-house performance was more 
economical under a direct conversion process (utilizing a market survey of existing 
contract prices in lieu of conducting a full A-76 cost study) – denied.  GAO found that 
the procuring agency followed proper procedures in conducting the A-76 direct 
conversion process.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
41. Shaw Infrastructure, Inc., B-291121, November 19, 2002 
Protest that procuring agency unreasonably denied protestor the opportunity to 
further revise its unacceptable proposal after discussions and final proposal revisions – 
denied.  GAO stated that the procuring agency acted reasonably, and was not required to 
allow additional proposal corrections.  (Contracting issue) 
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.)  
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42. Sodexho Management, Inc., B-289605.2, July 5, 2002 
Protest that the Government MP failed to meet numerous PWS requirements – 
denied.  GAO found that the procuring agency properly evaluated the MP, and that there 
was no basis to conclude that the MP failed to meet the PWS.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that the Government MP improperly used Government non-appropriated 
fund (NAFI) personnel for 80% of the MEO positions – sustained.  GAO stated that 
because NAFI employees receive lower wages and fringe benefits than normal 
appropriated fund Government personnel, the procuring agency had a duty to disclose the 
MEO’s use of NAFI employees to private sector offerors.  Lack of such disclosure 
created an unfair competition.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that procuring agency did not properly adjust the Government MP during 
the technical balancing phase – denied.  GAO found that the procuring agency 
appropriately documented the differences between the MP and the protestor’s proposal, 
and reasonably concluded that the differences did not constitute protestor improvements 
to performance or performance quality.  (A-76 Process – Balancing issue) 
Overall outcome – protest sustained (Government loss.) 
43. Southwest Anesthesia Services, B-279176.2, July 21, 1998 
Protest that the procuring agency’s decision to cancel a non A-76 solicitation was 
unreasonable – denied.  GAO found that the agency’s decision to increase its in-house 
medical anesthesia staffing (and thus cancel the solicitation) was within its right to 
determine the agency’s minimum needs.  (Contracting issue) 
Protest that the procuring agency should have conducted an A-76 competition 
prior to canceling a non-A-76 solicitation and securing services in-house – denied.  GAO 
stated that it does not generally review agency decisions to cancel solicitations and 
perform work with in-house personnel.  (Legal/GAO Procedural issue) 




44. Symvionics, Inc., B-281199.2, March 4, 1999 
Protest that agency failed to seal the Government MP in accordance with A-76 
RSH guidelines – denied.  GAO found that although the MP was mishandled and not 
placed in sealed envelope/container, it was otherwise properly completed, secured, and 
unaltered prior to the receipt and evaluation of protestor’s proposal.  Therefore, the 
protestor was not prejudiced.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that administrative appeal authority improperly allowed Government 
MEO to replace unallowable volunteer labor with proper appropriated fund personnel – 
denied.  GAO stated that the procuring agency acted properly in allowing the MP 
correction, and appropriately calculated the amount of replacement labor necessary.  (A-
76 Process issue)   
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
45. TDF Corporation, B-288392, B-288392.2, October 23, 2001 
Protest that a conflict of interest was created by the presence on the technical 
evaluation team of two Government employees from the function undergoing A-76 study 
– denied.  GAO noted that the two employees’ positions were designated as inherently 
governmental, and thus exempt from the study.  GAO found no evidence that the 
procuring agency’s evaluation of the protestor’s proposal was improper, nor did GAO 
find any evidence that the protestor was prejudiced by any potential conflict of interest. 
(A-76 Process issue)  
Protest that procuring agency improperly evaluated protestor’s staffing as 
unacceptable – denied.  GAO stated that the procuring agency properly evaluated the 
protestor’s staffing.  (Contracting issue)   
Overall outcome – protest denied (Government win.) 
46. Trajen, Inc., B-284310, B-284310.2, March 28, 2000 
Protest that administrative appeal authority failed to recognize that Government 
MP could not meet some PWS requirements – sustained.  GAO found that the 
administrative appeal authority did not recognize that MEO did not include personnel 
necessary to perform required painting tasks.  (A-76 Process issue) 
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Protest that administrative appeal authority directed the use of an improper tax 
adjustment rate from the tax table in the A-76 RSH – sustained.  GAO stated that the 
administrative appeal authority utilized a lower, incorrect tax rate.  The failure to use the 
correct tax adjustment rate for miscellaneous services resulted in a smaller decrease to the 
protestor’s proposed price.  (A-76 Process issue) 
Protest that administrative appeal authority improperly calculated the one-time 
conversion cost adjustment (added to protestor’s cost as an A-76 adjustment, reflecting 
anticipated Government personnel relocation costs in the event of an A-76 contractor 
victory) – sustained.  GAO found that the administrative appeal authority improperly 
overstated the one-time conversion cost by including the relocation cost of one military 
full-time equivalent (FTE), in addition to two civilian positions.  The A-76 RSH does not 
permit military personnel relocation expenses to be included in one-time conversion 
costs.  (A-76 Process issue) 
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